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Abstract
We consider the scenario where N utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the
mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market. Each utility aims at minimizing
its own cost of per-unit electricity by optimizing the bidding strategy, with uncertainty in demand and local renewable
generation taken into account. The per-unit electricity cost of a utility is a function of both the day-ahead clearing
price and the real-time spot price affected by the market-level supply-demand mismatch. We model the interactions
among utilities as a non-cooperative game and study the equilibrium strategies. We show that all utilities bidding
according to (net load) prediction is a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with two salient properties. First, it
incurs no loss of efficiency; hence, the competition among utilities does not increase the social cost. Second, it is
robust and (0, N − 1)-immune. Irrational fault behaviors of any subset of the utilities only help reduce the costs of
other rational utilities. We prove the results hold for correlated prediction errors and a general class of real-time spot
pricing models, which capture the relationship between the spot price, the day-ahead clearing price, and the market-
level mismatch. Simulations based on real-world traces corroborate our theoretical results. Our study highlights that
the market operator can design real-time pricing schemes according to the sufficient conditions derived in our paper,
such that the day-ahead market admits a unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium and it is robust to
irrational fault behaviors.
Index terms— Electricity Market, Bidding Strategy, Nash Equilibrium, Pareto Optimal, Fault Immunity, Electricity
Price.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern power system has been actively practicing deregulated electricity supply chain since the reform of
electricity supply industries in 1990’s [1]. Distinguished by the specific activities taken in the electricity transmission
structure, participants in the deregulated supply chain can be typically divided as generation companies, utility
companies, and sectors in charge of transmission and distribution networks [2]; see Fig. 1 for illustration. In
particular, utilities obtain electricity supply from the regional electricity market and local renewable sources to
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2Fig. 1. The deregulated electricity supply chain.
serve households and newly emerged active districts or microgrids. The market operator (known as independent
system operator (ISO), e.g., ISO-NE [3]) provides a trading place and matches the supply offers and demand bids
at two different timescales and prices, i.e., one day ahead with day-ahead price and in real-time with spot price [4],
[5].
• Day-Ahead Market: Generation companies (utilities) submit offers (bids) for selling (buying) electricity one
day before the actual dispatch, based on generation (net load) forecasting. They are cleared at a market clearing
price.
• Real-Time Market: Real-time market is designed to resolve the imbalance between the actual real-time demand
and the committed supply purchased from the day-ahead market, on an hourly basis. We remark that the real-
time electricity price depends on both the day-ahead clearing price as well as the real-time market level
imbalance.
The cost of the utility is composed of the payment in day-ahead market and the expense in real-time market to
settle the imbalance. NYISO reports that roughly 90% and 10% of electricity generation transactions are settled in
the day-ahead market and the real-time market, respectively [6].
Although existing electricity market is not a free market and is regulated to a certain degree, utilities can still
act strategically to lower their overall procurement cost. In particular, in day-ahead market, utilities can overbuy
(respectively underbuy) electricity given the load forecasting results, expecting they can sell the surplus in real-time
market at a higher price (respectively buy the shortage at a lower price). We remark that utilities interact with each
other in this process. The cost of a utility depends on not only its own bidding strategy, but also those of all other
utilities since they affect the real-time market-level imbalance and hence the real-time spot price.
Our study focuses on understanding such interactions among strategic utilities on the demand side of the electricity
supply chain; see a discussion on related works in Sec. I-B.
3A. Contributions
We formulate the interactions among utilities as a non-cooperative game. Utility aim at minimizing individual
costs by optimizing own bidding strategies in day-ahead market, taking into account uncertainty in load and local
renewable generation. We seek answers to three fundamental questions:
• What is the optimal bidding strategy of the utility under the game theoretic setting? In particular, does there
exist a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium1? If so, is it unique?
• Does competition introduce efficiency loss compared with the social optimal under the coordinated setting?
That is, what is the loss of efficiency2 at the equilibrium?
• How robust is the equilibrium against irrational fault behaviors3? In particular, will rational utilities suffer in
a fault-ridden setting with irrational utilities?
Answering these questions provides a deep understanding of the effectiveness of the electricity market design
and operation and the impact of load uncertainty. We conduct a comprehensive study and make the following
contributions.
To better bring out the insights and intuitions, we first focus on a baseline setting where the spot pricing model,
which describes the relationship among the spot price, day-ahead clearing price, and real-time market-level mismatch,
is linear, symmetric, and with a step jump at the origin [9], [10], and the load prediction errors across utilities are
mutually independent.
• After formulating the utility game in Sec. II, in Sec. III-B, we show the strategy profile where all utilities bid
according to (net load) prediction is a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
• In Sec. III-C, we show that the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium incurs no loss of efficiency. That is, the
social cost of the equilibrium is the same as the optimal one under the coordinated setting. Furthermore, the
equilibrium is robust and (0, N − 1)-immune. That is, irrational fault behaviors of any subset of the utilities
only help reduce the costs of other rational utilities [8].
We then generalize the results to the setting with general pricing models and correlated prediction errors.
• In Sec. IV, we present a set of sufficient conditions on spot pricing model for observing the unique, efficient,
and (0, N − 1)-immune pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. In particular, we show that our above results hold
for correlated prediction errors and a general class of real-time spot pricing models which can be nonlinear
and continuous at the origin. In addition, we extend our results to the setting in which utilities submit bidding
curves, which is the common practice in modern electricity market mechanism.
In Sec. V, we conduct extensive simulations based on price and load data from the ISO-NE electricity market.
The results corroborate our theoretical findings and highlight that it is possible to design effective real-time pricing
1A pure strategy corresponds to that individual utility only places one quantity for one bid in the day-ahead market, which is the common
practice.
2The ratio between the social cost of the equilibrium and the social optimal quantifies the loss of efficiency due to competition [7].
3An equilibrium is (; K)-immune if non-fault utilities’ expected costs do not increase by more than  when at most any K other utilities
deviate arbitrarily [8].
4schemes satisfying the sufficient conditions derived in our paper, such that the interactions among utilities admits a
unique, efficient, and robust pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Due to the space limitation, all proofs are presented
in the appendix.
B. Related Work
While there have been a number of works studying the optimal bidding strategies of generation companies on
the supply side of the electricity supply chain [11]–[14], those on utilities’ strategies on the demand side are most
related to our study. They mainly focus on two aspects.
The first is on optimal bidding strategy of utilities. This includes characterizing the maximum profit for individual
utility in the market [15] and optimal bidding strategy design [16]. The authors in [17] focus on the analysis of
single-settlement market mechanisms. Optimization methods considering demand response are proposed in [18]–
[20]. Bidding strategies based on time-series methods, data-driven predictions, and genetic algorithms are discussed
in [21], [22].
The second is on the impact of load uncertainty. This includes modeling the real-time electricity imbalance
and the impact of demand uncertainty [23]. It is observed that load uncertainty will affect utilities’ cost and the
electricity market equilibrium [15], [24], and renewable penetration is likely to deteriorate prediction errors and
consequently the cost of utilities [23], [25]–[27].
Our work differs from the existing literature in that, we consider the two-settlement electricity market structure
and we study the aggregate impact of all utilities’ bidding strategies on the individual utility’s cost with load
uncertainty.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our goal in this paper is to understand the optimal and equilibrium bidding behaviors of the utilities in the
day-ahead operation considering the two-settlement market structure. In particular, we model the market as a non-
cooperative game among N utilities in the same regional electricity market. Since the transactions are settled on
an hourly base, without loss of generality, we focus on the settlements of electricity supply of a particular hour.
We use pd and ps (unit: $/MWh) to denote the corresponding day-ahead price and the spot price, respectively. In
this paper, we make the following assumptions:
• The day-ahead price is cleared by ISO and is not affected by single utility’s day-ahead procurement.
We assume a single utility does not have market power to manipulate market price. This assumption allows us to
focus on a stylized model and better understand market operation.
• The utilities have distributional information on the actual net load through load forecasting.
The utilities estimate the real-time actual net load from the load forecasting result and the error distribution.
• The utilities only place one quantity bid in the day-ahead operation. The mismatch between the committed
supply and the actual demand is balanced in real-time operation.
The third assumption can be generalized to the case in which utilities submit demand curves as bidding pairs (price,
quantity); see the footnotes on page 5 for a discussion.
5We introduce the strategic behavior of utility, the market pricing model, the evaluation of the strategy, and the
market equilibrium in the following subsections.
A. Strategic Behavior of Utility and Load Mismatch Modeling
We define Di (unit: MWh) as the real-time actual net load of utility i at the particular hour, and it is only revealed
to the utility in the real-time operation. At the time when utility i carries out bidding into the day-ahead market, it
has a prediction of Di, denoted as Dˆi, modeled as follows:
Dˆi = Di + i,
where i is a random variable representing the load prediction error. Recall that it is affected by both the uncertainties
of demand and local renewable generation owned by the utilities and microgrids.
Given the load prediction Dˆi, utility i can strategically participate in the day-ahead market by bidding a quantity
Qi , Dˆi − µi, where
• µi = 0: Utility bids precisely according to prediction in the day-ahead market operation.
• µi > 0: Utility strategically underbuys in the day-ahead market operation.
• µi < 0: Utility strategically overbuys in the day-ahead market operation.
We use µi to represent the bidding strategy of utility i.
The bidding strategy of utility i will affect its mismatch between the real-time actual net load and the day-ahead
purchased supply in the real-time market operation, which is denoted as ∆i (unit: MWh). By definition, we have
∆i , Di −Qi = µi − i. (1)
Whenever there is an imbalance, i.e., ∆i 6= 0, the utility has to settle this imbalance in the real-time market
operation at the spot price ps, i.e., it either sells the residual electricity back to the market when ∆i < 0, or buys
the deficient electricity from the market when ∆i > 0.
In addition, for ease of presentation, we define
∆ ,
N∑
i=1
∆i, and ∆−i , ∆−∆i =
N∑
j:j 6=i
∆j
as the market-level mismatch and the aggregate mismatch of all other utilities except utility i, respectively.
B. Real-time Market Spot Pricing Model
The real-time market electricity price generally depends on the total supply and demand imbalance, i.e, the
difference between the day-ahead scheduled supply and the real-time actual demand. The displacement in the market
imbalance consequently results in the spot price being inconsistent with the day-ahead price. More specifically,
6deficient supply in the market leads to a higher spot price, whereas excessive supply results in a lower spot price.
To capture their relationship, we consider the following linear pricing model4 [10] (see Fig. 2 for illustration).
ps =

pd, ∆ = 0;
(a1∆ + b1)pd, ∆ > 0;
(a2∆ + b2)pd, ∆ < 0.
(2)
Here a1, a2, b1, b2∈ R+ are parameters of the pricing model.
Fig. 2. Real-time linear pricing function of pd and total imbalance ∆.
Remark: (i) The model was proposed in [10] by curve-fitting historical data. In general, a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2.
Specifically, [10] suggests a1 = 0.0034, a2 = 0.0005, b1 = 1.2378, and b2 = 0.6638. (ii) The spot price function is
discontinuous at ∆ = 0, i.e., b1 > 1 > b2. This discontinuity is interpreted as a premium of readiness that utilities
need to pay for the generation companies, since they have to generate urgent regulating power [9]. (iii) In this
paper, we first focus on the linear symmetric pricing model, i.e., a1 = a2 > 0, (b1pd + b2pd)/2 = pd, and b1 > b2,
which helps us extract insights from the theoretical results and provides a novel approach for market mechanism
design. However, our results are not restricted to the model in (2). In Sec. IV, we generalize our results to a larger
class of pricing models, which can be nonlinear or continuous at the origin.
C. Cost Function of Utilities and Strategic Bidding Game
For utility i, its actual net load Di is settled in two timescales: (i) an amount of Di − ∆i is settled in the
day-ahead operation at price pd, and (ii) the remaining amount ∆i is settled in the real-time operation at the spot
price ps.
Hence the total electricity cost of utility i, denoted as Ci, is given as follows (unit: $):
Ci , pd
(
Dˆi − µi
)
+ ps∆i = pd (Di −∆i) + ps∆i. (3)
4Generation imbalance from generation companies side also proposes an effect on the real-time market electricity price, e.g., in case of
generator failure or the uncertainty from large-scale renewable generation. This generation imbalance may increase the variability of the market
imbalance. This paper mainly focuses on the demand side of the electricity market and the effect of generation uncertainty on the market
imbalance is not considered.
7We further define the Average Buying Cost per unit electricity (ABC) for utility i as
ABCi ,
Ci
Di
=
1
Di
[pd (Di −∆i) + ps∆i] . (4)
Considering the net load uncertainty, the cost function for utility i is defined as the expected ABCi, i.e.,
Costi (µi, µ−i) , E[ABCi].
Note that the cost of utility i not only depends on its own strategy µi, but also depends on the strategies chosen
by other utilities in the market through µ−i. The underlying reason is that the real-time spot price is determined
by the market-level mismatch, thus other utilities’ strategic behavior can affect the cost of utility i through the spot
price ps.
Given the models of strategic behaviors and cost functions of the utilities, we model their interactions as a non-
cooperative game with N utilities where each utility aims to minimize its own cost Costi (µi, µ−i) by choosing a
strategy represented by µi from the strategy set R. Formally, a strategy profile µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) constitutes a
Nash Equilibrium if for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , we have
Costi (µ
∗
i , µ
∗
−i) ≤ Costi (µi, µ∗−i),∀µi ∈ R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
III. MAIN RESULTS: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
This section considers a single utility’s optimal strategic behavior from the cost minimization approach and
the joint impact of utilities’ strategies in the same regional electricity market. Under the two-settlement market
mechanism, we study the Existence, Uniqueness, Efficiency, and Robustness of the equilibrium of the game among
utilities. In this section, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. The real-time spot pricing model is linear symmetric, i.e., defined in (2) with a1 = a2, (b1pd +
b2pd)/2 = pd, and b1 > b2.
Assumption 2. The net load forecasting errors 1, · · · , N are mutually independent.
These two assumptions allow us to better understand the impacts of utilities’ strategies and the market equilib-
rium characteristics. Our results highlight that the symmetric pricing model provides a new approach for market
mechanism design. We later extend the results to general pricing models and correlated prediction errors case in
Sec. IV.
A. Load Imbalance Distribution Assumptions and Cost Analysis of Utilities’ Strategic Behaviors
In our study, we further assume that the net load forecasting error i follows a general proper distribution defined
below with zero mean and variance σ2i . Hence the load prediction Dˆi is an unbiased estimate of actual load Di.
Definition 1. The distribution of a random variable X is proper if its probability density function fX(·) is
8(i) Symmetric w.r.t. its mean ξ:
fX(ξ + x) = fX(ξ − x), ∀x ∈ R;
(ii) Central dominant:
fX(x) ≤ fX(y), if |x− ξ| ≥ |y − ξ|, ∀x, y ∈ R.
Here ξ ,
∫ +∞
−∞ x · fX(x)dx is the expected value of X .
Many prediction error distributions are proper, including Gaussian distribution and Laplace distribution. The
specific meaning of central dominant comes from that utilities tend to make larger prediction errors with smaller
probability compared with the case of smaller prediction errors with larger probability. Symmetric distribution
implies that utilities have equal chances to encounter positive or negative prediction errors. Simulation results in
Sec. V-B also verify these two conditions. Therefore, we pose the proper distribution assumption on net load
forecasting errors.
Assumption 3. For each i = 1, 2, ..., N , i follows a proper distribution with mean zero.
Considering utilities’ bidding strategies µi, the distribution of imbalance ∆i follows a proper distribution with
mean µi and variance σ2i , i.e.,
∆i ∼ Pi(µi, σ2i ), i = 1, 2, ..., N.
Recall that individual utility’s cost is affected by both its imbalance ∆i and the aggregate of all others utilities’
load imbalances ∆−i. Under the independent prediction error assumption, the following lemma characterizes the
distribution property of the sum of imbalances.
Lemma 1. Suppose that there are N independent random variables ∆1, · · · ,∆N , and for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , ∆i
follows a proper distribution with mean µi, then their sum ∆ ,
∑N
i=1 ∆i follows a proper distribution with mean
µ =
∑N
i=1 µi. In addition, if there exists one ∆i whose probability density function is strictly central dominant,
i.e.,
f∆i(x) < f∆i(y), if |x− ξ| > |y − ξ|, ∀x, y ∈ R,
then the probability density function of ∆ is also strictly central dominant.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is similar to Lindeberg–Le´vy Central Limit Theorem. From Lemma 1, we observe
that the total imbalance also follows a proper distribution if individuals ones follow proper distributions. According
to the independence assumption (Assumption 2), we have
∆ ∼ P(µ, σ2), and ∆−i ∼ P−i(µ−i, σ2−i),
where µ ,
∑N
i=1 µi, µ−i ,
∑N
j:j 6=i µj , σ
2 ,
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i , and σ
2
−i ,
∑N
j:j 6=i σ
2
j .
Based on the above observations, Theorem 1 characterizes the cost function Costi (µi, µ−i) = E[ABCi] of utility
i.
9Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1 and 2, the expectation of ABCi is given as:
E[ABCi] =pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(µiµ−i + σ2i + µ
2
i )
+(b1 − b2)E
[
∆i · F˜ (∆i)
]]
,
(5)
where F˜ (∆i) ,
∫ µ−i
−∆i f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i, f∆−i(·) is the PDF of ∆−i with mean µ−i, and coefficients a1,a2,b1,b2 are
parameters of the spot pricing model defined in (2).
Remarks: The expectation of ABCi in (5) depends on three terms. The first term is simply the day-ahead market
clearing price. The second and the third terms reveal the real-time market operation cost to balance the mismatch. It
is clear that the strategic behavior of utility i and the aggregation of all other utilities’ strategies in the same market
affect both the second and the third terms. In addition, the second term reveals the influence of the pricing model
slope and the third term presents the discontinuous part of the pricing model. Meanwhile, if Assumption 3 holds,
given µ−i = 0, both term two and term three are positive and we have the following observations on E[ABCi]:
• When the day-ahead market clearing price pd increases, E[ABCi] increases.
• When the slope of the real-time market pricing model increases, i.e., a1, a2 increases, E[ABCi] increases.
• When the discontinuous gap of the pricing model b1 − b2 increases, E[ABCi] increases.
In Sec. V-D, our simulation results verify these observations. The results show that utilities suffer higher costs
under higher day-ahead clearing price and larger real-time market sensitivity, corresponding to larger pd and larger
a1, a2, and b1 − b2.
B. Existence and Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium
A Nash Equilibrium in the game among utilities in the market is a strategic profile in which all utilities choose the
optimal strategy that minimizes its own cost given others’ behaviors. We start by understanding the characteristics
of the third term in (5).
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 3, given µ−i = 0, the optimal µ∗i that minimize E
[
∆i · F˜ (∆i)
]
is 0, and it is strictly
increasing w.r.t. |µi|, the absolute value of µi.
Lemma 2 shows that the third term in (5) that related to the discontinuous part of the spot pricing model will
increase if the utility deviates from bidding according to prediction, given that the aggregation of all other utilities’
strategies is zero.
Recall that utilities only place one quantity for one bid in the market, therefore, it is sufficient to focus on the
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium to understand the outcome of the game. With Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we present
the following necessary condition for all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.
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Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, a strategy profile µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) constitutes a pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium only if for all i = 1, 2, ..., N ,
• µ∗i = 0, if µ∗−i = 0;
• µ∗i ∈
(−µ∗−i, 0) , if µ∗−i > 0;
• µ∗i ∈
(
0,−µ∗−i
)
, if µ∗−i < 0.
(6)
Remarks: Theorem 2 says that if µ−i = 0, then the best response of utility i is to choose µ∗i = 0. If µ−i 6= 0,
then utility i′s optimal strategy will always be opposite to this value.
The insights behind the Theorem 2 can be revealed from the perspective of cost minimization. We note that
when the utility’s real-time mismatch has the same sign with the market-level mismatch, the utility will suffer a
loss; otherwise, it will gain. For example, when the market-level mismatch is positive, then the real-time price is
higher than the day-ahead price according to the pricing model. If the utility’s mismatch is negative, it means the
utility buys excessive energy in the day-ahead market and it can sell it back to the market at a higher price. Thus
the utility will gain. Recall that the utility’s prediction error follows a proper distribution with mean zero, which
indicates it has the same possibility to encounter particular positive or negative errors. Consequently, if the utility
strategically overbuys (respectively underbuys) when participating in the day-ahead market, its real-time imbalance
will tend to be negative (respectively positive).
With this in mind, let us look at the case when utility i chooses the bidding strategy µi > 0, given µ−i = 0.
Since the market-level mismatch follows a proper distribution P(µi, σ2), when µi > 0, the market-level mismatch
and the utility i′s mismatch tend to be positive simultaneously, thus the utility i tends to suffer a loss. Similarly,
when µi < 0, given µ−i = 0, the utility i will also suffer a loss.
Then we consider the cases when µ−i 6= 0. If µ−i > 0, the utility i will not choose µi > 0 since this will
make the market imbalance have more tendency to be positive. Similar result holds for the case when µi < −µ−i.
These two situations expose the utility under the risk that its imbalance has more possibility to have the same sign
with the market-level imbalance. Furthermore, choosing µi to be less than 0 and greater than −µ−i will always be
better than µi = 0 and µi = −µ−i. The optimal µ∗i comes from the trade-off between the price and the amount.
Similarly, when µ−i < 0, utility i will choose µi ∈ (0,−µ−i).
Suppose (µ∗1, µ
∗
2, ..., µ
∗
N ) is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium profile with m non-zero elements, where 1 ≤ m ≤
N . According to Theorem 2, for these m elements, denoted as (µ∗1, µ
∗
2, ..., µ
∗
m) without loss of generality, we define
αi ,
µ∗i
µ∗−i
∈ (−1, 0), ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m}.
It is straightforward to derive the following condition:
−1 α1 . . . α1
α2 −1 . . . α2
...
...
. . .
...
αm αm . . . −1


µ∗1
...
...
µ∗m
 =

0
...
...
0
 , (7)
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which describes the second and the third conditions in (6) for all non-zero µi. Let M be the left hand side m×m
matrix. We have the following results.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, the matrix M is a full rank matrix, and consequently µ∗ = (u∗1, u∗2 · · ·u∗N ) =
0 is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 2 and 3 show that for any day-ahead clearing price5 pd, if all utilities except utility i bid according
to prediction, then bidding according to prediction is the best response of utility i as well (see Fig. 3(a) for
illustration). Consequently the strategy profile that all utilities bid according to (net load) prediction is the unique
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Conventionally, Nash Equilibrium indicates that a utility does not benefit from
deviating from the equilibrium, assuming other utilities keep their strategies unchanged. In Corollary 1, we show
a stronger characteristic of the equilibrium. That is, the cost of the utility is strictly increasing w.r.t. the deviation
distance between the strategy chosen and the equilibrium. In Sec. IV, we extend the results to general pricing
models and correlated prediction errors (across utilities).
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, given µ−i = 0, the optimal µ∗i that minimize E[ABCi] is 0, and
E[ABCi] is strictly increasing w.r.t. |µi|.
C. Efficiency and Robustness of the Nash Equilibrium
We have shown that µ∗ = (u∗1, u∗2 · · ·u∗N ) = 0 is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. The next natural
question is what is the corresponding loss of efficiency? Recall that loss of efficiency is characterized as the gap
between the social cost under the strategic setting and the coordinated setting.
The optimal social cost under the coordinated setting is obtained by solving the following weighted utilitarian
social cost minimization problem:
min
µi∈R,∀i∈{1,2,··· ,N}
E[ABCtotal], (8)
where ABCtotal is defined as:
ABCtotal ,
Ctotal
Dtotal
=
∑
iDi · ABCi∑
iDi
=
1
Dtotal
[pd (Dtotal −∆) + ps∆] .
(9)
Here ∆ follows a proper distribution with mean µ =
∑N
i=1 µi, and ABCtotal (unit: $/MWh) can be interpreted as
the unit cost of the market to settle Dtotal ,
∑N
i=1Di amount of electricity.
The following theorem shows that there is no loss of efficiency at the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 4. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, E[ABCtotal] is minimized at µ∗ = 0, and E[ABCtotal] is strictly
increasing w.r.t. |µ|. Consequently, the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 incurs
no loss of efficiency.
5The day-ahead clearing price is not known to the utilities beforehand.
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Remarks: The intuition behind Theorem 4 lies in that we can treat the whole market as an entity. From the
market-level perspective, an amount of (Dtotal −∆) power is committed at the price pd and the imbalance ∆ is
settled at the spot market price ps. When the market has a particular positive (negative) real-time mismatch, this
mismatch is settled at a price ps > pd (ps < pd), respectively; hence the market will suffer a loss.
Since the market mismatch follows a proper distribution P(µ, σ2), when µ > 0, the market-level mismatch tends
to be positive, thus the market tends to suffer a loss facing a higher spot price. Similar analysis can be applied to
the case when µ < 0. We conclude that the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is efficient (see Fig. 3(a) for
illustration).
Furthermore, a socially optimal choice of strategies is also Pareto optimal by definition. That is, it is impossible
to decrease one utility’s cost without increasing others’ costs. Theorem 4 also implies that the unique and efficient
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is Pareto optimal. We have a stronger observation on the structure of the equilibrium,
and we define it as the Benevolent Pareto Optimality.
Theorem 5. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, consider all utilities except a group of utilities S, S ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N}
and 1 ≤ |S| ≤ N − 1. Given µj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}\{S}, E[ABCj ] is non-increasing w.r.t. |µS |, where
µS =
∑
i∈S µi. In addition, if there exists one ∆k, k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, whose probability density function is strictly
central dominant, then E[ABCj ] is strictly decreasing w.r.t. |µS |.
Theorem 5 shows that the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 is fault immune
[8]. Recall that fault immunity means that even if some irrational utilities fault and deviate from the equilibrium
arbitrarily, the costs of the non-faulty utilities are not affected by much. In particular, the Benevolent Pareto Optimal
Equilibria are (0, N − 1)-immune, where N is the number of utilities. That is, irrational fault behaviors of any
subset of the utilities do not increase the costs of other rational utilities (see Fig. 3(b) for illustration). Details of
fault tolerance and fault immunity can be found in [8].
(a) Existence and Efficiency of the pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium.
(b) Benevolent Pareto Optimality of the pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium.
Fig. 3. Illustration of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium under linear symmetric pricing model and Gaussian distributed prediction errors.
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IV. MAIN RESULTS: EQUILIBRIUM GENERALIZATION
Previous analysis focuses on the scenario where the real-time market pricing model is linear symmetric, prediction
errors of utilities are mutually independent, and utilities only place one quantity bid in the day ahead market. In
this section, we relax these assumptions and extend our results.
A. Beyond the Linear Symmetric Spot Pricing Model
The uniqueness, efficiency, and robustness of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium hold for a large class of pricing
models which can be nonlinear or continuous at the origin.
Theorem 6. Suppose Assumption 2 and 3 hold. Denote the pricing model as:
ps =

pd, ∆ = 0;
p(∆) + b1pd, ∆ > 0;
p(∆) + b2pd, ∆ < 0.
(10)
Here b1 +b2 = 2, b1 ≥ b2, p(∆) is a non-decreasing odd function, i.e., p(∆) = −p(−∆) and p(x) ≥ p(y),∀x ≥ y,
and p(∆) is continuous at ∆ = 0. The following statements hold:
(1) Given µ−i = 0, the optimal µ∗i that minimize E[ABCi] is 0, and E[ABCi] is non-decreasing w.r.t. |µi|.
Consequently, µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. In addition, if p(∆) is strictly
increasing w.r.t. ∆ or b1 > b2, then E[ABCi] is strictly increasing w.r.t. |µi|.
(2) If p(·) is differentiable for all x ∈ R, and
p′(x1) ≥ p′(x2) > 0, ∀x1 > x2 ≥ 0,
p′(x1) ≥ p′(x2) > 0, ∀x1 < x2 ≤ 0,
(11)
then µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
(3) E[ABCtotal] is minimized at µ∗ = 0, and E[ABCtotal] is non-increasing w.r.t. |µ|. Consequently, the pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 incurs no loss of efficiency. In addition, if p(∆) is strictly
increasing w.r.t. ∆ or b1 > b2, then E[ABCtotal] is strictly increasing w.r.t. |µ|.
(4) If p(·) is differentiable for all x ∈ R, and either
b1 > b2,
p′(x2) ≥ p′(x1) ≥ 0, ∀x1 > x2 ≥ 0,
p′(x2) ≥ p′(x1) ≥ 0, ∀x1 < x2 ≤ 0,
(12)
or
p′(x2) > p′(x1) ≥ 0, ∀x1 > x2 ≥ 0,
p′(x2) > p′(x1) ≥ 0, ∀x1 < x2 ≤ 0,
(13)
then the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 has a Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure.
Consequently, the equilibrium is (0, N − 1)-immune.
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Remarks: (i) The general pricing models defined in (10) are described by the discontinuous gap (b1 − b2) · pd
and the imbalance related term p(∆). The results in Sec. III are for the special case of Theorem 6 of the linear
symmetric pricing model. (ii) Theorem 6 indicates that the results obtained in Sec. III hold for general pricing
models, which can be nonlinear or continuous at the origin. (iii) µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 is always an efficient
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium under any non-decreasing symmetric spot pricing models. This equilibrium is unique
if (11) is satisfied. In particular, pricing models satisfying (11) are convex when ∆ > 0 and concave when ∆ < 0.
The pricing models satisfying (12) or (13) are concave when ∆ > 0 and convex when ∆ < 0. (iv) The linear
symmetric pricing model with discontinuous gap at the origin is the only one that satisfies both (11) and (12).
Consequently, the equilibrium under the linear symmetric model is unique, efficient, Benevolent Pareto Optimal,
and (0, N − 1)-immune. The above results show that if the real-time market scheme can be designed to meet the
corresponding sufficient conditions, then the market will admit the desired equilibrium.
(a) Discontinuous symmetric pricing model: b1 =
1.2378, b2 = 0.7622.
(b) Continuous symmetric pricing model: b1 = b2 = 1.
Fig. 4. Nonlinear pricing function p(x) = pd × (1{x>0}(a1xk + b1) + 1{x<0}(−a2(−x)k + b2) + 1{x=0}) with a1 = a2 = 0.0034,
pd = 35, k = 1.15 satisfying (11) and k = 0.9 satisfying (12), where 1{·} is the indicator function. To show the nonlinear relationship more
clearly and let the price within the reasonable range, we vary ∆ from -0.1GWh to 0.1GW.
B. Beyond Independent Prediction Errors
In practice, load forecasting errors among utilities may be correlated; see e.g., [28]. In this subsection, we relax
the independent prediction error assumption and consider the case that utilities’ prediction errors ∆i follow Gaussian
distributions, and they are correlated with correlation coefficient ρi,j , Cov (∆i,∆j) /σiσj ≥ 0. We obtain the
following results.
Theorem 7. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , ∆i follows a Gaussian distribution. In
addition, ρi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, i 6= j, then the strategy profile µ∗ = (µ∗1, µ∗2, ..., µ∗N ) = 0 is the unique
and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with the Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure and is (0, N−1)-immune.
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Theorem 7 states that with non-negative correlated Gaussian distribution prediction errors, the market still admits
a unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with Benevolent Pareto optimal structure.
C. Beyond Submitting Quantity Bid
The current trend in power systems and deregulated electricity markets is that utilities are allowed to react to
market prices since they may encounter short-term price fluctuation [29], [30]. In this subsection, we extend our
results to the setting in which utilities submit bidding pairs (price, quantity) which form the basis for the bidding
curves for each hour.
Similar as the previous analysis, let Di, Dˆi, and Qi(pd) be the actual net load, the net load prediction, and the
bidding curve of utility i under different day-ahead market price pd respectively. Then utility i′s bidding strategy and
the aggregate strategies of all other utilities in the day-ahead market can be represented by µi(pd) , Dˆi −Qi(pd)
and µ−i(pd) ,
∑N
j 6=i µj(pd) respectively.
Since he day-ahead clearing price pd is not known to the utilities beforehand, when considering the randomization
of pd, utilities report demand curves and aim to minimize the probability-weighted sum of E[ABCi| pd = pˆd], i.e.,
Ci(µi(pd), µ−i(pd)) ,
∫ +∞
0
E[ABCi| pd = pˆd]fi(pˆd)dpˆd,
where fi(·) is a probability density function defined on R+, which represents utility i′s estimation on the day-ahead
price pd. Note that we assume utilities are market price-takers and therefore their individual strategies will not affect
fi(·).
Consequently, under the setting in which utilities submit bidding curves, a strategy profile µ∗(pd) =
(µ∗1(pd), µ
∗
2(pd), ..., µ
∗
N (pd)) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , we have
Ci(µ
∗
i (pd), µ
∗
−i(pd)) ≤ Ci(µi(pd), µ∗−i(pd)),∀µi(pd) ∈ F,
where F is the set of all functions defined on R+. Based on above game theoretical formulation, we have the
following results.
Theorem 8. Suppose Assumption 2 and 3 hold. Denote the non-decreasing symmetric pricing model as (10) and
assume fi(pd) > 0,∀pd > 0. The following statements hold:
(1) The strategy profile µ∗(pd) = (µ∗1(pd), µ∗2(pd), ..., µ∗N (pd)) = 0 is an efficient pure strategy Nash Equilib-
rium.
(2) If (11) holds, µi(x) is piece - wise continuous on R+, and there does not exist a point x0 on µi(x)
such that µi(x0) 6= limx→x−0 µi(x) and µi(x0) 6= limx→x+0 µi(x), ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, then µ
∗(pd) =
(µ∗1(pd), µ
∗
2(pd), ..., µ
∗
N (pd)) = 0 is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
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(3) If (12) or (13) holds, then the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium µ∗(pd) = (µ∗1(pd), µ∗2(pd), ..., µ∗N (pd)) = 0
has a Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure6. Consequently, the equilibrium is (0, N − 1)-immune.
Theorem 8 states that, the strategy profile that all utilities submit vertical7 bidding curves exactly at the predicted
demand is a robust pure strategy Nash Equilibrium which incurs no loss of efficiency. Furthermore, under mild
continuity assumption8 on µi(x), the above efficient and robust equilibrium is unique.
We further extend the results to the scenario when utilities submit bidding curves with correlated load prediction
error.
Theorem 9. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , i follows a Gaussian distribution. In
addition, ρi,j ≥ 0, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, i 6= j, then the strategy profile µ∗(pd) = (µ∗1(pd), µ∗2(pd), ..., µ∗N (pd)) =
0 is an efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with the Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure and is (0, N − 1)-
immune. In addition, if µi(x) is piece-wise continuous on R+, and there does not exist a point x0 on µi(x) such
that µi(x0) 6= limx→x−0 µi(x) and µi(x0) 6= limx→x+0 µi(x), ∀i ∈ {i = 1, 2, ..., N}, then the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 9 states that when utilities submit bidding curves and the prediction errors have non-negative correlated
Gaussian distributions, all utilities submitting bidding curves at the predicted load is the unique, efficient pure
strategy Nash Equilibrium with the Benevolent Pareto optimal structure.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we verify our assumptions on the distribution of prediction errors and study the long-term market
equilibrium under various settings.
A. Simulation setting
We conduct simulations of the ISO-NE electricity market with 8 virtual utilities, each in charge of a state in New
England region. Each utility participates in the wholesale electricity market in the two-time settlement manner. The
realistic pricing model is obtained from [10]. We set a1 = a2 and (b1pd+b2pd)/2 = pd to guarantee the symmetricity
condition of the linear symmetric spot pricing model. We study the market equilibrium under symmetric pricing
6Under the setting of utilities submitting bidding curves, the corresponding Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure can be expressed as: consider
all utilities except a group of utilities S, S ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N} and 1 ≤ |S| ≤ N − 1. Given µj(pd) = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}\{S},
Cj(µS(pd), µ−S(pd)) is no greater than Cj(µ∗S(pd), µ−S(pd)), where µS(pd) =
∑
i∈S µi(pd) and µ
∗
S = 0. In addition, if under
different pd, there always exists one k(pd), k ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, whose probability density function is strictly central dominant, then
Cj(µS(pd), µ−S(pd)) is less than Cj(µ∗S(pd), µ−S(pd)) if µS(pd) 6= 0 at some interval (t, h), 0 < t < h.
7We assume that the net load Di is inelastic and does not change with the day-ahead clearing price pd. In reality, utilities may have price-
related flexible demands due to dynamic pricing [30]. Therefore, the net loads Di(pd) may change with price pd. Our results still hold under
such setting in which utilities submit bidding curves exactly at Qi(pd) = Di(pd) that react to the market prices and can be generalize to the
scenario with correlated prediction errors.
8The continuity assumption actually requires that the strategy curves µi(x) do not have discontinuity points isolated from the function, which
includes the continuous bidding curves as a special case. In our model, it means that utilities will not deviate from the strategy curves at some
particular points.
17
model and the impact of the asymmetricity of the realistic pricing model whose parameters are presented in Table.
I. The consecutive hourly electricity net loads of the 8 utilities from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2018 are
obtained from ISO-NE market. The day-ahead price is obtained from the mean of the hourly day-ahead prices from
ISO-NE market, which is 35$/MWh. We assume the day-ahead price is not affected by utilities’ bidding strategies
since about 90% of total electricity are transacted in the day-ahead market [6]. Utilities’ costs during each time slot
are calculated according to equation (3). We use E[ABCi] as the metric to evaluate utility i′s bidding strategy. We
focus on the utility in Maine state to carry out cost and equilibrium analysis. We observe similar results for other
utilities.
Table I
PARAMETERS OF PRICING MODELS
Pricing model and Parameters a1 a2 b1 b2
Symmetric pricing model 0.0034 0.0034 1.2378 0.7622
Realistic pricing model 0.0034 0.0005 1.2378 0.6638
B. Prediction Error Distribution
Our theoretical analysis focuses on the scenario that the prediction errors of utilities follow proper distributions
with zero mean. In this part, we verify our assumption on the symmetric distributed prediction errors.
In practice, utilities predict their demands based on historical loads, weather information, holiday/weekend
information, etc. [28]. Multiple types of load prediction methods are applied in short-term demand forecasting (e.g.,
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Time Series Regression). In our study, we use ANN to forecast demands and
the prediction errors are computed as the difference between the predicted values and the actual demands. We plot
the load prediction error histogram of the utility in Maine state in Fig. 5. Similar error histograms can be observed
for other utilities.
In our simulation, the sample mean of the load prediction error is -0.068 ($/MWh), and the sample standard
deviation is 38.7 ($/MWh). For testing the symmetric distribution around a specific center, we use Two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to conduct symmetry test on the load prediction error samples [31], [32]. This test is
used to test whether two underlying one-dimensional probability distributions differ. Notice that we assume the
prediction error  follows a proper distribution with the mean of zero. Let {X1, · · · , Xn} be the observed values
of the random variable . The result shows that the null hypothesis (i.e., “The sample data {X1, · · · , Xn} and
{−X1, · · · ,−Xn} are from the same continuous distribution”) is not rejected at the 5% significance level. This
observation verifies our symmetric distribution assumption on the load prediction error; that is, the load prediction
error follows a symmetric distribution with mean of zero. The Central dominant condition can also be justified. As
seen from the error histogram Fig. 5, when the amplitude of the prediction error becomes larger, it has a smaller
frequency of occurrence accordingly. We have similar observations for other utilities. Notice that here we do not
assume the independence of prediction errors among utilities. In our simulation, it is shown that there are positive
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correlation coefficients in load prediction errors among utilities, as large as 0.66. In the following subsection, we
find that our previous results still hold under this scenario, which shows the robustness of our analysis.
Fig. 5. Load prediction error distribution.
C. Long-term Market Equilibrium and Efficiency Performance
Previously we have shown that bidding according to prediction is the best response of the utility given all other
utilities bid at prediction. We now investigate the impact of the strategic behaviors of utilities on the long-term
ABC (defined as the total cost divided by total net loads) and study the market equilibrium and efficiency. We
obtained the long-term ABCi with respect to the bidding strategy µi of the utility in Maine state by calculating
the two-settlement average cost per hour in the consecutive 8 years, for different values of µi. Similar relationships
between costs and bidding strategies can also be observed for other utilities.
As seen in Fig. 10, the utility’s long-term cost takes the minimum when the utility bids according to prediction
given all others are bidding according to prediction. Thus the strategy profile that all utilities bid according to
prediction is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium under this setting. The above observation motivates utilities to
bid at predicted net load in order to not only minimize their expected costs over a particular time slot but also
minimize the long-term ABCs. Furthermore, we investigate the market-level long-term ABCtotal, which is computed
as the aggregate cost over aggregate demand of all utilities. It is easy to justify that the market-level long-term
ABCtotal only relates to µ =
∑N
i=1 µi. For a particular µˆ, we randomly decompose it such that µˆ =
∑N
i=1 µˆi.
The corresponding market-level long-term ABCtotal is computed as the average of long-term ABCs of different
strategy profiles. Fig. 10 shows that this equilibrium incurs no loss of efficiency with respect to the market-level
long-term ABCtotal.
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Fig. 6. Impact of the market size
on utility’s cost under equilib-
rium.
Fig. 7. Impact of the market
size on market-level cost under
equilibrium.
Fig. 8. Impact of the market
sensitivity on market-level cost.
Fig. 9. Impact of the market
sensitivity on market-level cost.
Fig. 10. Utility’s and market-level long-term cost w.r.t. µi. Fig. 11. Impact of the asymmetricity of the actual pricing model.
D. Market Size Analysis and Sensitivity of Real-time Market
The strategic potential of utilities arises from the dynamically changed real-time market electricity price. The
sensitivity of the real-time market and the market size may propose impacts on utilities’ costs. These two aspects
of the real-time market can be regarded as the price changing characteristics with respect to the total imbalance, i.e,
the slope and the discontinuous gap of the pricing model, and the number of participants N respectively. We want
to study the impact of these three parameters. Toward this end, we equally separate each one of the 8 utilities into 2
to 5 sub-utilities as expanding the market size and calculate each new utility’s ABC. Meanwhile, we vary the slope
of the symmetric pricing model to be 0.005, 0.034 and 0.068, and we change (b1, b2) to be (1, 1), (1.2378, 0.7622)
and (1.8, 0.2), which are sufficient to illustrate the impacts of the real-time market sensitivity to imbalance. The
corresponding utility’s cost and market level cost are studied. The trend of cost change can be observed when the
market size expands and the market sensitivity increases. We use a utility split from the original utility in Maine
state as an example to show the cost change. Similar cost reduction trend holds for other utilities.
As seen, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 reveal that both the utility’s long-term cost and the market-level cost under the
equilibrium decrease when N getting large. This characteristic implies that competition improves efficiency. Based
on these observations, market designers have an economic incentive to allow competition and expand market access
in order to lower both utilities’ costs and the market-level cost.
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Meanwhile, Fig. 8 depicts that when the slope of the linear symmetric spot pricing model becomes larger, i.e.,
larger a1 and a2, the utility suffers a larger cost given the same deviation quantity µi. The market-level long-term
ABCtotal presents a similar cost-strategy relationship, which is depicted in Fig. 9.
In addition, Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show that when the premium of readiness increases, i.e., larger b1 − b2, both
utilities and the market observe larger long-term costs under the same deviation quantity µi and µ.
We also study the impacts of day-ahead clearing price pd. Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 show that when the day-ahead
clearing price pd increases, both utilities and the market have lager long-term ABCs. Since the costs of utilities are
proportional to pd, we observe that there exist linear relationships between ABC and µi, and between ABCtotal
and µ.
These observations correspond to the previous theoretical results in Theorem 1. The above study suggests that
improving the level of competition and the resilience of the spot pricing against the market-level mismatch can not
only benefits utilities but also reduce the social cost.
Fig. 12. Impact of the premium of readiness on utility’s cost. Fig. 13. Impact of the premium of readiness on market-level
cost.
Fig. 14. Impact of day-ahead price on utility’s cost under
equilibrium.
Fig. 15. Impact of day-ahead price on market-level cost under
equilibrium.
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E. Performance under Realistic Pricing Model
We now study the impacts of the asymmetry of the realistic pricing model on the market equilibrium and the
utility’s cost. The pricing model parameters are listed in Table. I. We present the cost to strategy curve of the utility
in Maine state. We observe similar cost to strategy relationships for other utilities.
As seen, Fig. 11 shows that when all other utilities bid according to prediction, the utility has an incentive to
deviate from bidding according to prediction, which implies that the strategy profile that all utilities bid according
to prediction is no longer a Nash Equilibrium. Under the realistic pricing model, a utility can reduce its cost by
bidding higher than the predicted net load. This can be explained intuitively as follows: when the real-time market
performs less sensitive to the negative imbalance, i.e., a1 > a2, utilities can overbuy in the day-ahead market to
sell the surplus at a higher price compared with the symmetric pricing model case that we choose.
From the cost to strategy curve, the optimal non-zero bidding strategy for the utility is to choose µ∗i =
−68.5(MWh). Under this case, the utility only witnesses a 0.84% cost reduction compared with choosing µi = 0,
which indicates that under the realistic pricing model, the utility does not have much incentive to deviate from
bidding according to prediction given all other utilities bid according to prediction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the strategic behaviors of utilities under a non-cooperative game theoretical setting in the
day-ahead market considering the two-settlement structure of the deregulated wholesale electricity market and the
uncertainty in demand and local renewable generation. We show that, for the case with general spot pricing models
and correlated prediction errors (across utilities), all utilities bidding according to prediction is the unique, efficient,
and robust pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, which incurs no loss of efficiency and is (0, N−1)-immune to irrational
fault behaviors. In addition, our study suggests that market designers may improve the level of competition and the
resilience of the spot pricing against the market-level mismatch to reduce utilities’ costs and the social cost. Our
study provides new insights for market mechanism design in that the market operator can design real-time pricing
schemes according to the sufficient conditions derived in our paper, such that the interactions among utilities admit
a unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium and it is robust to irrational fault behaviors.
REFERENCES
[1] R. J. Gilbert and E. P. Kahn, International Comparisons of Electricity Regulation. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[2] D. S. Kirschen and G. Strbac, Fundamentals of Power System Economics. John Wiley & Sons, 2018.
[3] ISO New England. Internet: http://www.iso-ne.com/.
[4] S. Stoft, Power System Economics: Designing Markets for Electricity. IEEE press Piscataway, NJ, 2002, vol. 2.
[5] X.-P. Zhang, Restructured Electric Power Systems: Analysis of Electricity Markets with Equilibrium Models. John Wiley & Sons, 2010,
vol. 71.
[6] NYISO Market. Internet: http://www.nyiso.com/public/media room/\publication presentations/index.jsp.
[7] T. Roughgarden and E´. Tardos, “Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games,” Games and Economic Behavior,
vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 389–403, 2004.
[8] R. Gradwohl and O. Reingold, “Fault tolerance in large games,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce.
ACM, 2008, pp. 274–283.
22
[9] K. Skytte, “The regulating power market on the nordic power exchange nord pool: an econometric analysis,” Energy Economics, vol. 21,
no. 4, pp. 295–308, 1999.
[10] B. Neupane, T. B. Pedersen, and B. Thiesson, “Evaluating the value of flexibility in energy regulation markets,” in Proceedings of the
ACM e-Energy, 2015, pp. 131–140.
[11] Y. Xu and S. H. Low, “An efficient and incentive compatible mechanism for wholesale electricity markets,” IEEE Transactions on Smart
Grid, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 128–138, 2015.
[12] S. J. Kazempour and H. Zareipour, “Equilibria in an oligopolistic market with wind power production,” IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 686–697, 2013.
[13] B. Zhang, R. Johari, and R. Rajagopal, “Competition and efficiency of coalitions in cournot games with uncertainty,” IEEE Transactions
on Control of Network Systems, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 884–896, 2018.
[14] M. Rasouli and D. Teneketzis, “An efficient market design for electricity networks with strategic users possessing local information,” IEEE
Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 2019.
[15] M. Ventosa, A. Baıllo, A. Ramos, and M. Rivier, “Electricity market modeling trends,” Energy Policy, vol. 33, no. 7, pp. 897–913, 2005.
[16] A. K. David and F. Wen, “Strategic bidding in competitive electricity markets: a literature survey,” in IEEE Power Engineering Society
Summer Meeting. Seattle, USA, July, 2000, pp. 2168–2173.
[17] Nord Pool. Internet: http://www.nordpoolspot.com/How-does-it-work/.
[18] J. Aghaei and M.-I. Alizadeh, “Demand response in smart electricity grids equipped with renewable energy sources: A review,” Renewable
and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 18, pp. 64–72, 2013.
[19] F. Kamyab, M. Amini, S. Sheykhha, M. Hasanpour, and M. M. Jalali, “Demand response program in smart grid using supply function
bidding mechanism.” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 1277–1284, 2016.
[20] S. Nojavan, B. Mohammadi-Ivatloo, and K. Zare, “Optimal bidding strategy of electricity retailers using robust optimisation approach
considering time-of-use rate demand response programs under market price uncertainties,” IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution,
vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 328–338, 2015.
[21] S. Persson, “Simplify bidding on the day-ahead electricity market nordpool through structured time-series,” Dissertation, 2018.
[22] R. Herranz, A. M. San Roque, J. Villar, and F. A. Campos, “Optimal demand-side bidding strategies in electricity spot markets,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 27, no. 3, pp. 1204–1213, 2012.
[23] H. Yi, M. H. Hajiesmaili, Y. Zhang, M. Chen, and X. Lin, “Impact of the uncertainty of distributed renewable generation on deregulated
electricity supply chain,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 6183–6193, 2018.
[24] A. Safdarian, M. Fotuhi-Firuzabad, and M. Lehtonen, “A stochastic framework for short-term operation of a distribution company,” IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 4712–4721, 2013.
[25] D. W. Cai, S. Adlakha, S. H. Low, P. De Martini, and K. M. Chandy, “Impact of residential pv adoption on retail electricity rates,” Energy
Policy, vol. 62, pp. 830–843, 2013.
[26] L. Jia and L. Tong, “Renewables and storage in distribution systems: Centralized vs. decentralized integration,” IEEE JSAC, vol. 34, no. 3,
pp. 665–674, 2016.
[27] A.-H. Mohsenian-Rad and A. Leon-Garcia, “Optimal residential load control with price prediction in real-time electricity pricing
environments,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 120–133, 2010.
[28] Report on uncertainty modelling. Internet: http://www.e-umbrella.eu/82/.
[29] S.-E. Fleten and E. Pettersen, “Constructing bidding curves for a price-taking retailer in the norwegian electricity market,” IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 701–708, 2005.
[30] M. Song and M. Amelin, “Purchase bidding strategy for a retailer with flexible demands in day-ahead electricity market,” IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 1839–1850, 2016.
[31] T. Zheng and J. L. Gastwirth, “On bootstrap tests of symmetry about an unknown median,” Journal of Data Science, vol. 8, no. 3, p. 413,
2010.
[32] S. CSO¨RGO˝ and C. Heathcote, “Testing for symmetry,” Biometrika, vol. 74, no. 1, pp. 177–184, 1987.
23
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Without loss of generality, we may first assume that ∆1 and ∆2 both have zero mean values. Then for
∆ , ∆1 + ∆2, we have:
f∆(z) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)f∆2(z − x)dx
Then
f∆(−z) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)f∆2(−z − x)dx
=
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(−x)f∆2(−z + x)dx
=
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)f∆2(z − x)
= f∆(z)
(14)
Notice that f∆(z) is an even function. Next, we need to prove that:
f∆(z1) ≤ f∆(z2) if z1 ≥ z2 > 0
=⇒
f∆(z1) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)f∆2(z1 − x)dx
f∆(z2) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)f∆2(z2 − x)dx
Then
f∆(z1)− f∆(z2) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)[f∆2(z1 − x)− f∆2(z2 − x)]dx
Let
h(x) = f∆2(z1 − x)− f∆2(z2 − x)
Then
h(z1 + z2 − x) = f∆2(−z2 + x)− f∆2(−z1 + x)
= f∆2(z2 − x)− f∆2(z1 − x)
= −h(x)
(15)
Let us consider two points z1+z22 + x and
z1+z2
2 − x. Due to the symmetry of h(x), we have:
h(
z1 + z2
2
+ x) = −h(z1 + z2
2
− x) ≥ 0
and
f∆1(
z1 + z2
2
+ x) ≤ f∆1(
z1 + z2
2
− x)
Hence we conclude that f∆(z1)− f∆(z2) ≤ 0.
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In addition, if there exist one ∆i, i ∈ {12, · · · , N}, which satisfies the strictly central dominant condition:
f∆i(x) < f∆i(y) if |x− µi| > |y − µi|,
then ∆ =
∑N
i=1 ∆i also satisfies the strictly central dominant condition. Let us compute
f∆(z1)− f∆(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)[f∆2(z1 − x)− f∆2(−x)]dx
Without loss of generality, we assume ∆2 satisfies the strictly central dominant condition. Then f∆(z1)−f∆(0) < 0
since there exist some x > 0 such that f∆1(
z1
2 + x) < f∆1(
z1
2 − x). Similarly, let us compute
f∆(z1)− f∆(z2) =
∫ +∞
−∞
f∆1(x)[f∆2(z1 − x)− f∆2(z2 − x)]dx
Then f∆(z1) − f∆(z2) < 0 since there exist some x > 0 such that f∆1( z1+z22 + x) < f∆1( z1+z22 − x). This
complete the proof.
Based on above observation, we see that if all utilities satisfy proper distribution condition, and all other utilities
decide to bidding truthfully, then ∆−i follows proper distribution with mean value of 0.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: According to pricing model, given the day-ahead market price pd, the spot price ps is a linear step
function of ∆. Namely,
ps = 1{∆>0} · pd(a1∆ + b1) + 1{∆<0} · pd(a2∆ + b2) + pd · 1{∆=0}
= ξ1∆ + ξ2,
(16)
where 1{·} is indicator function, and
ξ1 , a1pd1{∆>0} + a2pd1{∆<0} + 0 · 1{∆=0},
and
ξ2 , b1pd1{∆>0} + b2pd1{∆<0} + pd1{∆=0}.
Then we can compute the expectation of ABCi in the following way:
E[ABCi] = E
[
pd +
∆i(ps − pd)
Di
]
= pd +
E[ps ·∆i]
Di
− pd
Di
µi. (17)
It remains to compute E[ps ·∆i]:
E[ps ·∆i] = E[(ξ1∆ + ξ2)∆i]
= E[(ξ1(∆i + ∆−i) + ξ2)∆i]
= E[ξ1∆2i + ξ1∆i∆−i + ξ2∆i]
(18)
So the E[ps ·∆i] can be divided into three terms. In the following, we will compute these three terms one by one.
It is easy to verify that when the price model is symmetric and all other utilities decide to bid truthfully, then:
E[ξ1∆2i ] =
(a1 + a2)pd
2
(σ2i + µ
2
i ),
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E[ξ1∆i∆−i] =
a1 + a2
2
pdµiµ−i,
It remains to compute E[ξ2∆i].
E[ξ2∆i] =
∫ +∞
−∞
δi
(∫ +∞
−δi
b1pdf∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i +
∫ −δi
−∞
b2pdf∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
)
f∆i(δi)dδi
= E
[
∆i
(∫ +∞
−∆i
b1pdf∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i +
∫ −∆i
−∞
b2pdf∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
)]
,
(19)
where in the last equality, the expectation is taken with respect to ∆i. Further, we have
E[ξ2∆i] = E
[
b1pd∆i
(
1−
∫ −∆i
−∞
f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i) + b2pd∆i
∫ −∆i
−∞
f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
)]
= b1pdµi + E
[
∆i(b2 − b1)pd
∫ −∆i
−∞
f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i)
]
= b1pdµi + E
[
∆i(b2 − b1)pd(
∫ µ−i
−∞
f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i +
∫ −∆i
µ−i
f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i)
]
= pdµi
b1 + b2
2
+ (b1 − b2)pdE
[
∆iF˜ (∆i)
]
,
(20)
where
F˜ (∆i) , −
∫ −∆i
µ−i
f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i =
∫ µ−i
−∆i
f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
To sum it up, when the pricing model is symmetric, i.e., a1 = a2, b1 + b2 = 2, then given µi = 0, The expectation
of ABCi is given as:
E[ABCi] = pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(σ2i + µ
2
i ) + (b1 − b2)E
[
∆iF˜ (∆i)
]
] (21)
Where F˜ is defined as above and E[ABCi] takes the minimal value when µi = 0. Then this complete the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: Notice that the above F˜ (·) is an odd function when µ−i = 0. Let us define
U(µi) = E
[
∆iF˜ (∆i)
]
Then
U(−µi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
−µi
∆i
(δi) · F˜ (δi)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
(−δi)f−µi∆i (−δi) · F˜ (−δi)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi) · F˜ (−δi)
= U(µi)
(22)
Hence it is sufficient to consider the case of µi > 0. Let us compute
U(µi)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δiF˜ (δi) · (fµi∆i(δi)− f0∆i(δi)) (23)
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Let
g1(x) = xF˜ (x) + (x− µi)F˜ (x− µi),
g2(x) = −xF˜ (x) + (x− µi)F˜ (x− µi),
g3(x) = f
µi
∆i
(x)− f0∆i(x)
Then
g1(µi − x) = (µi − x)F˜ (µi − x) + (−x)F˜ (−x) = g1(x)
g2(µi − x) = −(µi − x)F˜ (µi − x) + (−x)F˜ (−x) = −g2(x)
g3(x) = f
µi
∆i
(µi − x)− f0∆i(µi − x) = f0∆i(x)− fµi∆i(x) = −g3(x)
Hence
U(µi)− U(0) = 1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
[g1(δi)− g2(δ)] · g3(δi)dδi
=
1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
g1(δi) · g3(δi)dδi − 1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
g2(δi) · g3(δi)dδi
= −
∫ +∞
µi
2
g2(δi) · g3(δi)dδi
(24)
Since f∆i satisfy the proper distribution conditions, it is easy to see that g3(δi) ≥ 0 if δi ≥ µi2 . We want to show
that for δi ≥ µi2 , g2(δi) ≤ 0. To see this, consider the following two cases: when δi ≥ µi, we have 0 ≤ δi−µi < δi,
then g2(δi) < 0, when µi2 < δi ≤ µi, we have 0 ≤ µi − δi < δi, then g2(δi) < 0.
Thus when δi > µi2 , g3(δi) ≥ 0 and g2(δi) < 0. Finally, we get
U(µi)− U(0) = 1
2
∫ +∞
−∞
[g1(δi)− g2(δ)] · g3(δi)dδi
= −
∫ +∞
µi
2
g2(δi) · g3(δi)dδi
> 0
(25)
The last strictly > is got since g3(δi) > 0 for some δi.
This proves the Lemma 2.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: When the pricing model is symmetric, we have
E[ABCi] = pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(µiµ−i + σ2i + µ
2
i ) + (b1 − b2)
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ δi+µ−i
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi]. (26)
Let
U(µi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ δi+µ−i
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi.
Assume µ−i > 0
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i) when µi > 0,
U(µi)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δi
[
fµi∆i(δi)− f0∆i(δi)
] · ∫ δi+µ−i
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi. (27)
Let us use ∆f(δi) to denote f
µi
∆i
(δi)− f0∆i(δi). Consider two symmetric points µi2 + δi and µi2 − δi, where δi ≥ 0,
then
(
µi
2
+ δi)∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i + (
µi
2
− δi)∆f(µi
2
− δi)
∫ µi
2 −δi+µ−i
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
=
µi
2
∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
µi
2 −δi+µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i + δi∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
−µi2 +δi−µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i.
(28)
The above equality holds since ∆f(µi2 + δi) = −∆f(µi2 − δi) and it is easy to verify that the upper formula is no
less than zero. Hence we have: U(µi)− U(0) ≥ 0 when µi > 0.
ii) when µi < −µ−i,
U(µi)− U(−µ−i) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δi
[
fµi∆i(δi)− f
−µ−i
∆i
(δi)
]
·
∫ δi+µ−i
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi (29)
Let us use ∆f(δi) to denote f
µi
∆i
(δi)− f−µ−i∆i (δi).
Consider two symmetric points µi−µ−i2 + δi and
µi−µ−i
2 − δi, where δi ≥ 0, then
(
µi − µ−i
2
+ δi)∆f(
µi − µ−i
2
+ δi)·∫ µi+µ−i
2 +δi
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i + (
µi − µ−i
2
− δi)·
∆f(
µi − µ−i
2
− δi)
∫ µi+µ−i
2 −δi
0
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
=
µi − µ−i
2
∆f(
µi − µ−i
2
+ δi)
∫ µi+µ−i
2 +δi
µi+µ−i
2 −δi
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
+ δi∆f(
µi − µ−i
2
+ δi)
∫ µi+µ−i
2 +δi
−µi+µ−i2 +δi
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
(30)
The above equality holds since ∆f(µi−µ−i2 + δi) = −∆f(µi−µ−i2 − δi) and it is easy to verify that the upper
formula is no less than zero. Hence we have: U(µi)− U(µ−i) ≥ 0 when µi < −µ−i.
Next, we want to show that the above U(µi) function is left continuous at µi = 0 and right continuous at
µi = −µ−i respectively.
i) Left continuous at µi = 0
What we need to prove is that:
lim
µi→0−
U(µi) = U(0)
U(µi)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
0
µi
2
∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
µi
2 −δi+µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
+
∫ +∞
0
δi∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
−µi2 +δi−µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
(31)
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Let K∆−imax , f∆−i(0) and K∆imax , f∆i(0).
It is easy to see that ∫ +∞
0
µi
2
∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
µi
2 −δi+µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi ≥ 0
and ∫ +∞
0
µi
2
∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
µi
2 −δi+µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
≤
∫ +∞
0
µi
2
∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)dδi =
µi
2
∫ µi
2
−µi2
f0∆i(δi)dδidδi
≤ K∆imax ·
(µi)
2
2
(32)
As to the second term, when µi → 0−, we have µi2 + µ−i > −µi2 − µ−i, then we derive:∫ +∞
0
δi∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
−µi2 +δi−µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi ≤ 0
and ∫ +∞
0
δi∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)
∫ µi
2 +δi+µ−i
−µi2 +δi−µ−i
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
≥
∫ +∞
0
δi∆f(
µi
2
+ δi)dδi =
µi
2
+
∫ µi
2
−µi2
δif
0
∆i(δi)dδi
=
µi
2
(33)
Then we have:
µi
2
≤ U(µi)− U(0) ≤ K∆imax ·
(µi)
2
2
Finally we have
lim
µi→0−
U(µi) = U(0)
This proves that the cost function is left continuous at µi = 0.
ii) Right continuous at µi = −µ−i
What we need to prove is that:
lim
µi→−µ+−i
U(µi) = U(−µ−i)
V (µi)− V (−µ−i) =
∫ +∞
0
µi − µ−i
2
∆˜f
∫ δi+µi+µ−i2
−δi+µi+µ−i2
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
+
∫ +∞
0
δi∆˜f
∫ δi+µi+µ−i2
δi−µi+µ−i2
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
(34)
Let K∆−imax , f∆−i(0), K∆imax , f∆i(0) and define
∆˜f = fµi∆i(
µi−µ−i
2 + δi)− f
µ−i
∆i
(µi−µ−i2 + δi).
It is easy to see that ∫ +∞
0
µi − µ−i
2
∆˜f
∫ δi+µi+µ−i2
−δi+µi+µ−i2
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi ≤ 0
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and ∫ +∞
0
µi − µ−i
2
∆˜f
∫ δi+µi+µ−i2
−δi+µi+µ−i2
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
≥ µi − µ−i
2
∫ +∞
0
∆˜fdδi =
µi − µ−i
2
∫ µi+µ−i
2
−µi+µ−i2
f0∆i(δi)dδi
≥ K∆imax(µi + µ−i) ·
µi − µ−i
2
(35)
As to the second term, when µi → −µ+−i, we have µi+µ−i2 > −µi+µ−i2 , then we derive:∫ +∞
0
δi∆˜f
∫ δi+µi+µ−i2
δi−µi+µ−i2
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi ≥ 0
and ∫ +∞
0
δi∆˜f
∫ δi+µi+µ−i2
δi−µi+µ−i2
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
≤ K∆−imax(µi + µ−i) ·
∫ +∞
0
δi∆˜fdδi
≤ K∆−imax
(µi + µ−i)2
2
(36)
Then we have:
K∆imax(µi + µ−i) ·
µi − µ−i
2
≤ V (µi)− V (−µ−i),
and
V (µi)− V (−µ−i) ≤ K∆−imax
(µi + µ−i)2
2
Finally we have
lim
µi→−µ+−i
U(µi) = U(−µ−i)
This proves that the cost function is right continuous at µi = −µ−i.
Next, we want to show that the minimal value of the above cost function for utility i can only be attained with
ai(µi, µ−i) · µ−i, where ai(µi, µ−i) ∈ (−1, 0), without causing confusion, we will use ai to denote ai(µi, µ−i).
When µi → 0−,
µ−i · µi < µiµ−i + µ2i < (µ−i + 2µi) · µi
Then (
a1 + a2
2
µ−i +
b1 − b2
2
)
· µi < ∆E[ABCi]
and
∆E[ABCi] <
(
a1 + a2
2
(µ−i + 2µi) +
b1 − b2
2
K∆imaxµi
)
· µi,
where ∆E[ABCi] , E[ABCi](µi)− E[ABCi](0). Hence we have ∆E[ABCi] < 0,
It is clear when µi decrease a little bit from 0, the cost function value will also decrease. In other words, the
left derivative of E[ABCi] is positive at µi = 0.
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When µi → −µ+−i,
(µ−i + 2µi) · (µi + µ−i) < µiµ−i + µ2i < −µ−i · (µi + µ−i)
Then (
a1 + a2
2
(µ−i + 2µi) +
b1 − b2
2
K∆imax(µi − µ−i)
)
· (µi + µ−i) < ∆˜E[ABCi] (37)
and
∆˜E[ABCi] <
(
a1 + a2
2
· (−µ−i) + b1 − b2
2
K∆−imax · (µi + µ−i)
)
· (µi + µ−i) (38)
where ∆˜E[ABCi] , E[ABCi](µi) − E[ABCi](−µ−i). It is clear when µi decrease a little bit from 0, the cost
function value will also decrease. In other words, the right derivative of E[ABCi] is negative at µi = −µ−i.
From the above analysis, we see that given µ−i > 0, the optimal strategy of utility i that minimize E[ABCi],
µ∗i ∈ (−µ−i, 0). Similar analysis can be constructed when µ−i < 0 and the optimal strategy of utility i that
minimize E[ABCi], µ∗i ∈ (0,−µ−i).
This complete the proof of Theorem 2.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Previous we have shown that {u∗1, u∗2 · · ·u∗N} where u∗i = 0 for ∀i is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Assume there exist another strategy profile {u˜1, u˜2 · · · u˜N} where there exist at least one u˜i 6= 0. From the best
response perspective of Nash Equilibrium, it is natural to derive the following condition of the NE strategy profile:

0 a1 . . . a1 a1
a2 0 . . . a2 a2
...
...
. . .
...
...
aN−1 aN−1 . . . 0 aN−1
aN aN . . . aN 0


u˜1
u˜2
...
...
u˜N−1
u˜N

=

u˜1
u˜2
...
...
u˜N−1
u˜N

(39)
⇒ 
1 −a1 . . . −a1 −a1
−a2 1 . . . −a2 −a2
...
...
. . .
...
...
−aN−1 −aN−1 . . . 1 −aN−1
−aN −aN . . . −aN 1


u˜1
u˜2
...
...
u˜N−1
u˜N

=

0
0
...
...
0
0

(40)
If we want to show that {u∗1, u∗2 · · ·u∗N} where u∗i = 0 for ∀i is the unique Nash Equilibrium, it is equivalent to
show that there do not exist another strategy profile {u˜1, u˜2 · · · u˜N} where there exist at least one u˜i 6= 0. Assume
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we have a such strategy profile with total m elements to be non-zero, and use {u˜1 · · · u˜j · · · u˜m} to denote. Where
1 ≤ m ≤ N then the equivalent condition turns to be:
1 −a1 . . . −a1
−a2 1 . . . −a2
...
...
. . .
...
−aN −aN . . . 1


u˜1
...
...
u˜m
 =

0
...
...
0
 (41)
To proceed, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The matrix M with the below form is of full rank, where bi ∈ (0, 1), ∀i ∈ {1, 2 · · ·m}.
M =

1 b1 . . . b1
b2 1 . . . b2
...
...
. . .
...
bm bm . . . 1

Proof: Consider the determinant of the matrix.
det(M) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 b1 . . . b1
b2 1 . . . b2
...
...
. . .
...
bm bm . . . 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 b1 − 1 . . . b1 − 1
b2 1− b2 . . . 0
... 0
. . . 0
bm 0 . . . 1− bm
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Applying the property in Schur complement, let
A = [1] B =
[
b1 − 1 · · · b1 − 1
]
C =

b2
...
bm
 D =

1− b2 . . . 0
0
. . . 0
0 . . . 1− bm

we have det(M) = det(D)det(A−BD−1C), where
D−1 =

1
1−b2 . . . 0
0
. . . 0
0 . . . 11−bm

Hence it is easy to see that det(M) > 0. Then matrix M is of full rank.
The above observation shows that there do not exist such a profile with non-zero entries but satisfy the equilibrium
condition.
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This prove the uniqueness of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the case as stated in Theorem 3.
F. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: It is easy to compute E[ABCtotal]
E[ABCtotal] = pd +
E[ps ·∆]
Dtotal
− pd
Dtotal
µ.
where ∆ =
∑N
i=1 ∆i, Dtotal =
∑N
i=1Di and µ =
∑N
i=1 µi. It remains to compute E[ps ·∆]:
E[ps ·∆] = E[(ξ1∆ + ξ2)∆] = E[ξ1∆2 + ξ2∆].
Previous from Lemma 1 we have shown that the total mismatch is symmetric distributed and centralized at µ =∑N
i=1 µi. Let f
µ
∆ be the probability density function of ∆, then: when a1 = a2, we have
E[ξ1∆2] =
∫ 0
−∞
a2pdδ
2fµ∆(δ)dδ +
∫ +∞
0
a1pdδ
2fµ∆(δ)dδi
=
(a1 + a2)pd
2
(σ2 + µ2)
(42)
Secondly, let us compute E[ξ2∆i].
E[ξ2∆] =
∫ 0
−∞
b2pdδf
µ
∆(δ)dδ +
∫ +∞
0
b1pdδf
µ
∆(δ)dδi
= b1pdµ+ (b2 − b1)pd
∫ 0
−∞
δfµ∆(δ)dδ
=
b1 + b2
2
pdµ+ (b2 − b1) ·
[∫ −µ
−∞
δf0∆(δ)dδ + µ
∫ −µ
0
f0∆(δ)dδ
] (43)
Let
U(µ) =
∫ −µ
−∞
δf0∆(δ)dδ + µ
∫ −µ
0
f0∆(δ)dδ
It is easy to see that U(µ) = U(−µ), hence it is sufficient to consider the case of µ > 0.
when µ > 0,
U(µ)− U(0) =
∫ −µ
0
δf0∆(δ)dδ + µ
∫ −µ
0
f0∆(δ)dδ
=
∫ 0
µ
δfµ∆(δ)dδ < 0
(44)
where the last inequality comes from fµ∆(·) is centralized at µ.
Then consider µ1 > µ2 > 0.
U(µ1)− U(µ2) = −
∫ µ1
0
δfµ1∆ (δ)dδ +
∫ µ2
0
δfµ2∆ (δ)dδ
= −
((∫ µ1−µ2
0
+
∫ µ1
µ1−µ2
)
δfµ1∆ (δ)dδ −
∫ µ2
0
δfµ2∆ (δ)dδ
)
= −
∫ µ1−µ2
0
δfµ1∆ (δ)dδ + (µ2 − µ1)
∫ 0
−µ2
f0∆(δ)dδ < 0
(45)
where the last inequality comes from f0∆(·) is centralized at 0, hence −
∫ µ1−µ2
0
δfµ1∆ (δ)dδ ≤ 0 and (µ2 −
µ1)
∫ 0
−µ2 f
0
∆(δ)dδ < 0.
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From the above proof we see that as long as the mean value of total imbalance µ =
∑N
i=1 µi = 0, this shows that
the unique Nash Equilibrium strategy profile {u∗1, u∗2 · · ·u∗N} where u∗i = 0 for ∀i ∈ {1, 2 · · ·N} is efficient from
the social cost minimization perspective. In addition, the more the imbalance deviates from 0, the more inefficient
the market is.
G. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: It is easy to verify that when the price model is symmetric and the utility j decides to bid truthfully,
then:
E[ξ1∆2j ] =
(a1 + a2)pd
2
σ2j ,
E[ξ1∆j∆−j ] =
a1 + a2
2
pdµjµ−j = 0,
We still need to calculate E[ξ2∆j ]
E[ξ2∆j ] = E
[
b1pd∆j
(
1−
∫ −∆j
−∞
f∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j) + b2pd∆j
∫ −∆j
−∞
f∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j
)]
= b1pdµj + E
[
∆i(b2 − b1)pd
∫ −∆j
−∞
f∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j)
]
= b1pdµj + E
[
∆i(b2 − b1)pd(
∫ µ−j
−∞
f∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j +
∫ −∆j
µ−j
f∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j)
]
= pdµj
b1 + b2
2
+ (b1 − b2)pdE
[
∆jFˆ (∆j)
]
(46)
Where Fˆ , − ∫ −∆j
µ−j
f∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j =
∫ µ−j
−∆j f∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j
Let us define
V (µ−j) = E
[
∆jFˆ (∆j)
]
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δjf∆j (δj) ·
∫ µ−j
−δj
f
µ−j
∆−j (δ−j)dδ−jdδj
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δjf∆j (δj) ·
∫ 0
−δj−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−jdδj
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δjf∆j (δj) · (
∫ 0
−δj
+
∫ −δj
−δj−µ−j
)f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−jdδj
(47)
Consider
V (−µ−j) = E
[
∆iFˆ (∆j)
]
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δjf∆j (δj) ·
∫ −µ−j
−δj
f
µ−j
∆−j (δ−j)dδ−jdδj
=
∫ +∞
−∞
(−δj)f∆j (−δj) ·
∫ 0
δj+µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−jdδj
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δjf∆j (δj) ·
∫ 0
−δj−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−jdδj
= V (µ−j)
(48)
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Hence it is sufficient to consider the case of µ−j > 0. Let us compute
V (µ−j)− V (0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δjf∆j (δj)
∫ −δj
−δj−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−jdδj (49)
Then consider δ∗j and −δ∗j
For
δ∗j f∆j (δ
∗
j )
∫ −δ∗j
−δ∗j−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j + (−δ∗j ) · f∆j (−δ∗j )
∫ δ∗j
δ∗j−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j
= δ∗j f∆j (δ
∗
j )(
∫ −δ∗j
−δ∗j−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j −
∫ δ∗j
δ∗j−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)dδ−j)
(50)
Since δ∗j f∆j (δ
∗
j ) ≥ 0 and f0∆−j (δ−j) satisfy the proper distribution conditions. We have∫ −δ∗j
−δ∗j−µ−j
f0∆−j (δ−j)−
∫ δ∗j
δ∗j−µ−i
f0∆−j (δ−j) ≤ 0
Then we have
V (µ−j)− V (0) ≤ 0
To sum up, when the pricing model is symmetric, i.e., a1 = a2, b1 + b2 = 2, then given µj = 0, The expectation
of ABCj is given as:
E[ABCj ] = pd +
pd
Dj
[
a1 + a2
2
σ2j + (b1 − b2)E
[
∆iFˆ (∆j)
]
], (51)
where Fˆ is defined as above and E[ABCj ] takes the maximal value when µ−j = 0. Meanwhile, if strictly central
dominant condition is satisfied for either ∆−j or ∆j , it is easy to prove the decreasing part. This completes the
proof.
H. Proof of Theorem 6 (1)
Proof: According to pricing model, given the day-ahead market price pd, the spot price ps is a linear step
function of ∆. Namely,
ps = 1{∆>0} · (p(∆) + b1pd) + 1{∆<0} · (p(∆) + b1pd) + 1{∆=0} · pd
= ξ1 + ξ2,
(52)
where 1{·} is indicator function, and
ξ1 , p(∆),
and
ξ2 , b1pd1{∆>0} + b2pd1{∆<0} + pd1{∆=0}.
Then we can compute the expectation of ABCi in the following way:
E[ABCi] = E
[
pd +
∆i(ps − pd)
Di
]
= pd +
E[ps ·∆i]
Di
− pd
Di
µi. (53)
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It remains to compute E[ps ·∆i]:
E[ps ·∆i] = E[(ξ1 + ξ2)∆i] = E[ξ1∆i + ξ2∆i] (54)
So the E[ps ·∆i] can be divided into two terms. In the following, we will compute these two terms one by one.
It is easy to verify that when the price model is symmetric and all other utilities decide to bid truthfully, then:
E[ξ2∆i] has the same expression as linear price model case.
It remains to compute E[ξ1∆i].
E[ξ1∆i] =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi (55)
Let
U(µi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
Then
U(−µi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
−µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
(−δi)f−µi∆i (−δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(−δi − δ−i)f∆−i(−δ−i)dδ−idδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
=U(µi)
(56)
Consider
U(µi)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δi(f
µi
∆i
(δi)− f0∆i(δi))
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi (57)
Then consider µi2 + δi and
µi
2 − δi.
(
µi
2
+ δi)∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi +
µi
2
+ δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
− (µi
2
− δi)∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
p(−δi + µi
2
+ δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
=
µi
2
∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi +
µi
2
+ δ−i)− p(−δi + µi
2
+ δ−i)] · f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
+ δi∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi +
µi
2
+ δ−i) + p(−δi + µi
2
+ δ−i)]f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
≥ 0
(58)
Further more, considering µ1 > µ2 > 0
U(µ1)− U(µ2) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δi(f
µ1
∆i
(δi)− fµ2∆i(δi))
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi. (59)
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Then consider µ1+µ22 + δi and
µ1+µ2
2 − δi.
(
µ1 + µ2
2
+ δi)∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi +
µ1 + µ2
2
+ δ−i) · f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
−(µ1 + µ2
2
− δi)∆f ·
∫ +∞
−∞
p(−δi + µ1 + µ2
2
+ δ−i)f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
=
µ1 + µ2
2
∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi +
µ1 + µ2
2
+ δ−i)− p(−δi + µ1 + µ2
2
+ δ−i)] · f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
+ δi∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi +
µ1 + µ2
2
+ δ−i) + p(−δi + µ1 + µ2
2
+ δ−i)]f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
≥ 0
(60)
This complete the the proof of Theorem 6 (1).
I. Proof of Theorem 6 (2)
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume µ−i > 0. Let us compute E[ξ1∆i].
E[ξ1∆i] =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f
µ−i
∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi (61)
Let
U(µi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
µi
∆i
(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f
µ−i
∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
When µi > 0, consider
U(µi)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δi(f
µi
∆i
(δi)− f0∆i(δi)) ·
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f
µ−i
∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi (62)
Then consider µi2 + δi and
µi
2 − δi.
(
µi
2
+ δi)∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi +
µi
2
+ δ−i)f
µ−i
∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
− (µi
2
− δi)∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
p(−δi + µi
2
+ δ−i)f
µ−i
∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
=
µi
2
∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi +
µi
2
+ δ−i + µ−i)
− p(−δi + µi
2
+ δ−i + µ−i)]f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
+ δi∆f
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi +
µi
2
+ δ−i + µ−i)
+ p(−δi + µi
2
+ δ−i + µ−i)]f∆−i(δ−i)dδ−i
> 0
(63)
The last inequality comes form that the pricing function is increasing. Further more, considering µi > −µ−i,
following similar approach, we can prove that
U(µ1)− U(−µ−i) > 0
The above observation reveals that the utility will not choose to bid at µi > 0 and µi < −µ−i.
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Then let us consider the left derivative at µi = 0− and right derivative at µi = −µ−i+.
When µi → 0−
U(µi)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)− p(δi + δ−i + µ−i)]f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
+ µi
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi) ·
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
(64)
For the second term, we can prove that
µi
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i) · f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi ≤ µip(µi + µ−i) < 0 (65)
For the first term,∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)− p(δi + δ−i + µ−i)]f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
=
∫ +∞
0
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)− p(δi + δ−i + µ−i)]f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
−
∫ +∞
0
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(−δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)− p(−δi + δ−i + µ−i)]f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
= µi ·
∫ +∞
0
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
[p′(δi + δ−i + µ−i)− p′(−δi + δ−i + µ−i)]f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
(66)
Consider two symmetric points −µ−i +  and −µ−i − , where  ≥ 0. The inner integral part is∫ +∞
0
[p′(δi + )− p′(−δi + )]f0∆−i(−µ−i + )d
+
∫ +∞
0
[p′(δi − )− p′(−δi − )]f0∆−i(−µ−i − )d
(67)
It is easy to prove that this term is non-negative. Hence when µi → 0−, U(µi)− U(0) < 0.
We have
U(−µ−i) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
− µ−i
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
(68)
It is easy to prove that
µ−i
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi = 0
When µi → −µ+−i
U(µi)− U(−µ−i) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)·∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)− p(δi + δ−i)]·
f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi + µi
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi)·∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
(69)
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For the first term, we can prove that∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)− p(δi + δ−i)] · f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
= (µi + µ−i)
∫ +∞
0
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
0
[p′(δi + δ−i)− p′(−δi + δ−i)
+ p′(−δi + δ−i)− p′(−δi − δ−i)] · f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
= 0
(70)
For the second term,
µi
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i) · f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
= µi
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
[p(δi + δ−i + µi + µ−i)− p(δi + δ−i)] · f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
= µi(µi + µ−i)
∫ +∞
−∞
f0∆i(δi) ·
∫ +∞
−∞
p′(δi + δ−i)f0∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
< 0
(71)
This complete the first part of Theorem 6 (2).
J. Proof of Theorem 6 (3)
Proof: It is easy to compute E[ABCtotal]
E[ABCtotal] = pd +
E[ps ·∆]
Dtotal
− pd
Dtotal
µ.
where ∆ =
∑N
i=1 ∆i, Dtotal =
∑N
i=1Di and µ =
∑N
i=1 µi. It remains to compute E[ps ·∆]:
E[ps ·∆] = E[(ξ1 + ξ2)∆] = E[ξ1∆ + ξ2∆] (72)
So the E[ps ·∆] can be divided into two terms. In the following, we will compute these two terms one by one.
It is easy to verify that when the price model is symmetric and all other utilities decide to bid truthfully, then:
E[ξ2∆] has the same expression as linear price model case.
It remains to compute E[ξ1∆].
E[ξ1∆] =
∫ +∞
−∞
δfµ∆(δ)p(δ)dδ (73)
Let
U(µ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δfµ∆(δ)p(δ)dδ
Then
U(−µ) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δf−µ∆ (δ)p(δ)dδ =
∫ +∞
−∞
δf∆(δ + µ)p(δ)dδ
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δf∆(−δ + µ)p(δ)dδ = U(µ)
(74)
Consider
U(µ)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δ(fµ∆(δ)− f0∆(δ))p(δ)dδ
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Then consider µ2 + δ and
µ
2 − δ.
(
µ
2
+ δ)∆fp(δ +
µ
2
)− (µ
2
− δ)∆fp(−δ + µ
2
)
=
µ
2
∆f [p(δ +
µ
2
)− p(−δ + µ
2
)] + δ∆f [p(δ +
µ
2
) + p(−δ + µ
2
)]
≥0
(75)
Further more, considering µ1 > µ2 > 0
U(µ1)− U(µ2) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δ(fµ1∆ (δ)− fµ2∆ (δ))p(δ)dδ
Then consider µ1+µ22 + δ and
µ1+µ2
2 − δ.
(
µ1 + µ2
2
+ δ)∆fp(δ +
µ1 + µ2
2
)− (µ1 + µ2
2
− δ)∆fp(−δ + µ1 + µ2
2
)
=
µ1 + µ2
2
∆f [p(δ +
µ1 + µ2
2
)− p(−δ + µ1 + µ2
2
]
+ δ∆f [p(δ +
µ1 + µ2
2
) + p(−δ + µ1 + µ2
2
)]
≥0.
(76)
This complete the proof.
K. Proof of Theorem 6 (4)
Proof: As to the Pareto optimal part, we define
U(µ−i) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f
µ−i
∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
Then
U(−µ−i) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f
−µ−i
∆−i (δ−i)dδ−idδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
(−δi)f0∆i(−δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(−δi − δ−i)f−µ−i∆−i (−δ−i)dδ−idδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i)f
µ−i
∆−i(δ−i)dδ−idδi
= U(µ−i)
(77)
Consider
U(µ−i)− U(0) =
∫ +∞
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
p(δi + δ−i) · (fµ−i∆−i(δ−i)− f0∆−i(δ−i))dδ−idδi
=
∫ +∞
0
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
(p(δi + δ−i)− p(−δi + δ−i)) · (fµ−i∆−i(δ−i)− f0∆−i(δ−i))dδ−idδi
(78)
Then consider µ−i2 + δ−i and
µ−i
2 − δ−i.∫ +∞
0
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
−∞
(p(δi + δ−i)− p(−δi + δ−i)) · (fµ−i∆−i(δ−i)− f0∆−i(δ−i))dδ−idδi
=
∫ +∞
0
δif
0
∆i(δi)
∫ +∞
0
[p(δi +
µ−i
2
+ δ−i)− p(−δi + µ−i
2
+ δ−i)
− p(δi + µ−i
2
− δ−i) + p(−δi + µ−i
2
− δ−i)]∆f∆−idδ−idδi
≤ 0
(79)
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The last ’<’ holds if the strictly inequality in derivative of the pricing function exists. The decreasing part can be
proved by similar approach without requiring the strictly central dominant condition to be satisfied. This complete
the proof of Theorem 6 (4).
L. Proof of Theorem 7
Previous analysis focuses on the scenario that the load forecasting error of utilities are mutually independent, in
this section, we relax this assumption to consider more general case, i.e., the load forecasting error of utilities are
correlated. More specifically, we assume the load forecasting error of utility i, denoted as ∆i, follows Gaussian
distribution with mean µi and variance σ2i and they are jointly normal. For simplicity, we assume that the correlation
between ∆i and ∆j are ρij for any i and j and the covariance matrix of random vector [∆1,∆2, ...,∆N ] can be
expressed as: 
σ21 ρ12σ1σ2 · · · ρ1Nσ1σN
ρ12σ1σ2 σ
2
2 · · · ρ2Nσ2σN
...
...
. . .
...
ρ1Nσ1σN ρ2Nσ2σN · · · σ2N
 ,
For simplicity, let us consider ρij ≥ 0,∀i, j, i.e., we assume there are positive correlation among utilities.
Under these assumptions, we define ∆−i =
∑N
j,j 6=i ∆j and have
∆−i ∼ N (µ−i, σ2−i),
where µ−i =
∑
j 6=i µj and σ
2
−i =
∑
j 6=i σ
2
j + 2
∑
1≤j1<j2≤N,j1 6=i,j2 6=i ρj1j2σj1σj2 .
Obviously, [∆i,∆−i] follows bivariate normal distribution and their joint PDF is
f(δi, δ−i) =
1
2piσiσ−i
√
1− ρ2i
exp(− 1
2(1− ρ2i )
[
(δi − µi)2
σ2i
+
(δ−i − µ−i)2
σ2−i
− 2ρi(δi − µi)(δ−i − µ−i)
σiσ−i
]),
(80)
where ρi is the correlation between ∆i and ∆−i and it can be expressed as
ρi =
E[∆i∆−i]− E[∆i]E[∆−i]
σiσ−i
=
∑
j 6=i(ρijσiσj + µiµj)− µi(
∑
j 6=i µj)
σi
√∑
j 6=i σ
2
j + 2
∑
1≤j1<j2≤N,j1 6=i,j2 6=i ρj1j2σj1σj2
=
∑
j 6=i ρijσj√∑
j 6=i σ
2
j + 2
∑
1≤j1<j2≤N,j1 6=i,j2 6=i ρj1j2σj1σj2
.
The following theorem characters the expected ABCs of utilities.
Theorem 10. When the pricing model is symmetric, i.e., a1 = a2, b1 + b2 = 2, the expected ABC of utility i can
be expressed as:
E[ABCi] = pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(σ2i + µ
2
i + µiµ−i + ρiσiσ−i)
+
b1 − b2
2
E[∆ierf(
∆i+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
∆i−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)]].
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Proof: We know that
E[ABCi] = pd +
E[ps ·∆i]
Di
− pd
Di
µi. (81)
where E[ps ·∆i] can be expressed as:
E[ps ·∆i] = E[ξ1∆2i + ξ1∆i∆−i + ξ2∆i]. (82)
It then remains to compute E[ξ1∆2i ], E[ξ1∆i∆−i] and E[ξ2∆i].
Let f(δi, δ−i) in Eq. (80) be the joint PDF of ∆i and ∆−i. Let us first compute E[ξ1∆2i ]:
E[ξ1∆2i ] =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
E[ξ1∆2i |∆i = δi,∆−i = δ−i] · f(δi, δ−i)dδidδ−i
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δ2i
(∫ +∞
−δi
a1pdf(δi, δ−i)dδ−i +
∫ −δi
−∞
a2pdf(δi, δ−i)dδ−i
)
dδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δ2i
(
a1pdf∆i(δi)(
1
2
+
1
2
erf(
δi+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
δi−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
))
+a2pdf∆i(δi)(
1
2
− 1
2
erf(
δi+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
δi−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
))
)
dδi
=
a1 + a2
2
pd(σ
2
i + µ
2
i ).
Secondly, let us compute E[ξ2∆i] :
E[ξ2∆i] =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
E[ξ2∆i|∆i = δi,∆−i = δ−i] · f(δi, δ−i)dδidδ−i
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δi
(∫ +∞
−δi
b1pdf(δi, δ−i)dδ−i +
∫ −δi
−∞
b2pdf(δi, δ−i)dδ−i
)
dδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δi
(
b1pdf∆i(δi)(
1
2
+
1
2
erf(
δi+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
δi−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
))
+b2pdf∆i(δi)(
1
2
− 1
2
erf(
δi+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
δi−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
))
)
dδi
=
b1 + b2
2
pdµi +
b1 − b2
2
pdE[∆ierf(
∆i+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
∆i−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)].
Lastly, let us compute E[ξ1∆i∆−i]. For ease of presentation, let us denote A =
δi+µ−i
σ−i +ρi
δi−µi
σi√
2(1−ρ2i )
.
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E[ξ1∆i∆−i] =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
E[ξ1∆i∆−i|∆i = δi,∆−i = δ−i] · f(δi, δ−i)dδidδ−i
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δi
(
a1pdf∆i(δi)(
µ−i + σ−iρi δi−µiσi
2
(1 + erf(A)) + σ−i
√
1− ρ2i
2pi
e
− 1
2(1−ρ2
i
)
A2
)
+a2pdf∆i(δi)(
µ−i + σ−iρi δi−µiσi
2
(1− erf(A))− σ−i
√
1− ρ2i
2pi
e
− 1
2(1−ρ2
i
)
A2
)
dδi
=
a1 + a2
2
pd
∫ +∞
−∞
δif∆i(δi)(µ−i + σ−iρi
δi − µi
σi
)dδi
=
a1 + a2
2
pd(µiµ−i + ρiσiσ−i).
Then plug in Eqs. (81) and (82), we can get the final result.
What we need to prove is that, given µ−i = 0, the optimal µ∗i that minimize E[ABCi] is 0, and E[ABCi] is
strictly increasing w.r.t. |µi|
Proof: Given µ−i = 0, the expected ABC of utility i can be simplified as:
E[ABCi] = pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(σ2i + µ
2
i + ρiσiσ−i)
+
b1 − b2
2
E[∆ierf(
∆i
σ−i
+ ρi
∆i−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)]].
To prove that E[ABCi] obtains its minimum when µi = 0, we rewrite it as
E[ABCi] = g1(µi) + g2(µi),
where
g1(µi) = pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(σ2i + µ
2
i + ρiσiσ−i)]
and
g2(µi) =
pd
Di
b1 − b2
2
E[∆ierf(
∆i
σ−i
+ ρi
∆i−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)].
It is straightforward to verify that argminµig1(µi) = 0 and it is increasing w.r.t.|µi|. So it remains to show that
argminµig2(µi) = 0 and it is increasing w.r.t |µi|. Since b1 > b2, it is equivalent to show
argminµiE[∆ierf(
∆i
σ−i
+ ρi
∆i−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)] = 0.
Denote U(µi) = E[∆ierf(
∆i
σ−i+ρi
∆i−µi
σi√
2(1−ρ2i )
)]. It remains to prove that argminµiU(µi) = 0.
Firstly, we note that U(µi) is an even function. To see this, consider the following equations:
U(−µi) = 1√
2piσi
∫ +∞
−∞
x · erf(
x
σ−i
+ ρi
x+µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)e
− (x+µi)2
2σ2
i dx
=
1√
2piσi
∫ +∞
−∞
(−x) · erf(−
x
σ−i
+ ρi
x−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
) · e−
(−x+µi)2
2σ2
i dx
= U(µi).
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Then it remains to prove that ∀µ > 0, U(µ)− U(0) > 0. When µ > 0, we have
U(µ)− U(0) = E[Xµerf(
Xµ
σ−i
+ ρi
Xµ−µ
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)]− E[X0erf(
X0
σ−i
+ ρi
X0
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)],
where Xµ ∼ N (µ, σ2i ) and X0 ∼ N (0, σ2i ).
Denote µ0 =
ρiσ−i
σi+ρσ−i
µ, obviously µ0 > 0 and
E[Xµerf(
Xµ
σ−i
+ ρi
Xµ−µ
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)] = E[(Xµ − µ0)erf(
Xµ
σ−i
+ ρi
Xµ−µ
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)]
+ µ0E[erf(
Xµ
σ−i
+ ρi
Xµ−µ
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)]
= E[(Xµ − µ0)erf(
( 1σ−i + ρi
1
σi
)(Xµ − µ0)√
2(1− ρ2i )
)]
+ µ0E[erf(
( 1σ−i + ρi
1
σi
)(Xµ − µ0)√
2(1− ρ2i )
)].
(83)
Denote random variable Y = Xµ−µ0, then Y ∼ N (µy, σ2i ) and µy = µ−µ0 > 0. Further, let k =
1
σ−i+ρi
1
σi√
2(1−ρ2i )
> 0,
we have
U(µ)− U(0) = E[Y erf(kY )] + µ0E[erf(kY )]− E[X0erf(kX0)].
Since µy > 0, we know that E[Y erf(kY )]−E[X0erf(kX0)] > 0 and larger |µ| is, larger the difference. Further,
since E[erf(k(Y − µy))] = 0, we have that
E[erf(kY )] = E[erf(kY )]− E[erf(k(Y − µy))]
= E[erf(kY )− erf(k(Y − µy))]
=
1√
2piσi
∫ +∞
−∞
(erf(ky)− erf(k(y − µy)))e
− (y−µy)
2
2σ2
i dy
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that erf(x) is increasing in x and erf(ky)− erf(k(y − µy)) ≥ 0.
In addition, we have when |µ| increases, µ0E[erf(kY )] increases. Then we prove that for any µ > 0,
U(µ)− U(0) > 0.
Thus argminµiU(µi) = 0.We also have larger |µ| is, larger the difference.
The efficiency part is the same as the independent case.
As to the Pareto optimal part, we have: given µi = 0, the optimal µ∗−i that maximize E[ABCi] is 0.
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Proof: When a1 = a2, b1 + b2 = 2, given µi = 0, the expectation of ABCi can be expressed as
E[ABCi] = pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(σ2i + ρiσiσ−i)
+
b1 − b2
2
E[∆ierf(
∆i+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
∆i
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)]]
= pd +
pd
Di
[
a1 + a2
2
(σ2i + ρiσiσ−i)
+
b1 − b2
2
E[∆ierf(k1(∆i + k2µ−i))]],
where
k1 =
1
σ−i
+ ρi
1
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
, k2 =
σi
σi + ρiσ−i
.
We prove that E[ABCi] attains its maximum at µ−i = 0. Note that ddz erf(z) =
2√
pi
e−z
2
, the first order derivative
of E[ABCi] w.r.t. µ−i can be expressed as
∂E[ABCi]
∂µ−i
=
pd
Di
b1 − b2
2
k1k2
2√
pi
E[∆ie−k
2
1(∆i+k2µ−i)
2
].
When µ−i = 0, we can get that
∂E[ABCi]
∂µ−i
=
pd
Di
b1 − b2
2σ−i
k1k2
2√
pi
E[∆ie−k
2
1∆
2
i ] = 0,
where the equality follows since g(δi) = δie−k
2
1δ
2
i is an odd function, and the PDF of ∆i is even function, thus
E[∆ie
− ∆
2
i
2σ2−i ] = 0. In order to prove that µ−i = 0 is the maximum, we need to show that
∂E[ABCi]
∂µ−i
> 0 for µi < 0
and ∂E[ABCi]∂µ−i < 0 for µi > 0. To prove this, we have
E[∆ie−k
2
1(∆i+k2µ−i)
2
] =
∫ +∞
−∞
δie
−k21(δi+k2µ−i)2−
δ2i
2σ2
i dδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δie
− δ
2
i+2σ
2
i k
2
1(δi+k2µ−i)2
2σ2
i dδi
=
∫ +∞
−∞
δie
−σ
2
i+2ρiσiσ−i+σ2−i
2(1−ρ2
i
)σ2−iσ2i
(δi+
µ−iσi(σi+ρiσ−i)
σ2
i
+2ρiσiσ−i+σ2−i
)2
dδi · e
− µ
2−i
2(σ2
i
+2ρiσiσ−i+σ2−i)
= e
− µ
2−i
2(σ2
i
+2ρiσiσ−i+σ2−i) (− µ−iσi(σi + ρiσ−i)
σ2i + 2ρiσiσ−i + σ
2
−i
) ·
√
2piσ2−iσ
2
i (1− ρ2i )
σ2i + 2ρiσiσ−i + σ
2
−i
,
where the last equality follows by the fact that∫ +∞
−∞
xe−a(x−b)
2
dx = b
√
pi
a
.
Further, we note that
σi + ρiσ−i ≥ 0,
thus it is straightforward to verify that ∂E[ABCi]∂µ−i > 0,∀µ−i < 0 and
∂E[ABCi]
∂µ−i
< 0,∀µ−i > 0. Thus µ−i = 0 is the
maximum point of E[ABCi].
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As to the unique part, assume µ−i > 0
U(µi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
x · erf(
x+µ−i
σ−i
+ ρi
x−µi
σi√
2(1− ρ2i )
)e
− (x+µi)2
2σ2
i dx
=
∫ +∞
−∞
x · erf(
( 1σ−i +
ρi
σi
)(x−
ρi
σi
µi
1
σ−i+
ρi
σi
) + µ−iσ−i√
2(1− ρ2i )
)e
− (x+µi)2
2σ2
i dx
Let t = x−
ρi
σi
µi
1
σ−i+
ρi
σi
, k1 =
1
σ−i√
2(1−ρ2i )
and k2 =
ρi
σi√
2(1−ρ2i )
.
Then
U(µi) =
∫ +∞
−∞
(t+
k2
k1 + k2
µi) · erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)e
−
(t− k1
k1+k2
µi)
2
2σ2
i dx
=
∫ +∞
−∞
t · erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)e
−
(t− k1
k1+k2
µi)
2
2σ2
i dx
+
∫ +∞
−∞
k2
k1 + k2
µi · erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)e
−
(t− k1
k1+k2
µi)
2
2σ2
i dx
For the first term
dU1(µi)
dµi
=
k1
k1 + k2
∫ +∞
−∞
t(t− k1
k1 + k2
µi)e
−
(t− k1
k1+k2
µi)
2
2σ2
i · erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)dt
For the second term
dU2(µi)
dµi
=
k2
k1 + k2
∫ +∞
−∞
e
−
(t− k1
k1+k2
µi)
2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)dt
+
k1k2
(k1 + k2)2
µi
∫ +∞
−∞
(t− k1
k1 + k2
µi) · e
−
(t− k1
k1+k2
µi)
2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)dt
It is easy to prove that when µi = 0,
dU1(µi)
dµi
∣∣∣∣
µi=0
=
k1
k1 + k2
∫ +∞
−∞
t2e
− t2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)dt > 0
dU2(µi)
dµi
∣∣∣∣
µi=0
=
k2
k1 + k2
∫ +∞
−∞
e
− t2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)dt > 0
When µi = −µ−i
dU1(µi)
dµi
∣∣∣∣µi=−µ−i = k1k1 + k2
∫ +∞
−∞
t(t+
k1
k1 + k2
µ−i) · e
−
(t+
k1
k1+k2
µ−i)2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)dt < 0
dU2(µi)
dµi
∣∣∣∣µi=−µ−i = k1k2(k1 + k2)2 (−µ−i)
∫ +∞
−∞
(t+
k1
k1 + k2
µ−i) · e
−
(t+
k1
k1+k2
µ−i)2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)t+ k1µ−i)dt < 0
It remains to show that when µi > 0,
dU(µi)
dµi
> 0 and when µi < −µ−i, dU(µi)dµi < 0.
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When µi > 0, let z = t− k1k1+k2µi
dU1(µi)
dµi
=
k1
k1 + k2
∫ +∞
−∞
(z +
k1
k1 + k2
µi) · ze
− z2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)((k1 + k2)z + k1(µi + µ−i))dz > 0
dU2(µi)
dµi
=
k2
k1 + k2
∫ +∞
−∞
e
− z2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)z + k1(µi + µ−i))dt
+
k1k2
(k1 + k2)2
µi
∫ +∞
−∞
ze
− z2
2σ2
i erf((k1 + k2)z + k1(µi + µ−i))dt
> 0
This holds since both term 1 and term 2 are greater than zero.
Similarly, when µi < −µ−i, we have dU1(µi)dµi < 0, and
dU2(µi)
dµi
< 0 This complete the proof when ρi ∈ [0, 1).
Next, we calculate the cost under ρi = 1. When ρi = 1, there exist a positive linear relationship between ∆i and ∆−i.
Previously people have proved that when ρi = 1: δi−µi = c·(δ−i−µ−i), for all possible numerical values(δi, δ−i),
where c = σiσ−i .
It is easy to verify that when the pricing model is linear symmetric, what we need to calculate is the term
E[ξ2∆i].
E[ξ2∆i] =
∫ σ−i
σi+σ−i µi−
σi
σi+σ−i µ−i
−∞
δib2pdf
µi
∆i
(δi)dδi +
∫ +∞
σ−i
σi+σ−i µi−
σi
σi+σ−i µ−i
b1pdf
µi
∆i
(δi)dδi
= b1pdµi + (b2 − b1)pd
∫ σ−i
σi+σ−i µi−
σi
σi+σ−i µ−i
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi − µi)dδi
= b1pdµi + (b2 − b1)pd
[∫ −σi
σi+σ−i µi−
σi
σi+σ−i µ−i
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)dδi
+
∫ −σi
σi+σ−i µi−
σi
σi+σ−i µ−i
−∞
µif
0
∆i(δi)dδi
]
=
b1 + b2
2
pdµi + (b2 − b1)pd
[∫ −σi
σi+σ−i µi−
σi
σi+σ−i µ−i
−∞
δi·
f0∆i(δi)dδi +
∫ −σi
σi+σ−i µi−
σi
σi+σ−i µ−i
0
µif
0
∆i(δi)dδi
]
(84)
Let
U(µi) =
∫ − σiσi+σ−i µi− σiσi+σ−i µ−i
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)dδi +
∫ − σiσi+σ−i µi− σiσi+σ−i µ−i
0
µif
0
∆i(δi)dδi (85)
let k = σiσi+σ−i ∈ (0, 1). Then
U(µi) =
∫ −k(µi+µ−i)
−∞
δif
0
∆i(δi)dδi +
∫ −k(µi+µ−i)
0
µif
0
∆i(δi)dδi
We can calculate the derivative with respect to µi as
dU(µi)
dµi
= k2(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))− kµif0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))−
∫ k(µi+µ−i)
0
f0∆i(δi)dδi (86)
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When µ−i = 0
dU(µi)
dµi
= k2µif
0
∆i(kµi)−
∫ kµi
0
f0∆i(δi)dδi
Hence when µi > 0
k2µif
0
∆i(kµi)−
∫ kµi
0
f0∆i(δi)dδi < k
2µif
0
∆i(kµi)− kµif0∆i(kµi) < 0
Similarly when µi < 0
k2µif
0
∆i(kµi)−
∫ kµi
0
f0∆i(δi)dδi > 0
This prove the part that bidding according to prediction is the pure strategy NE. The efficient part is same. As to
the Pareto optimal part, given µi = 0 and µ−i > (<)0
dU(µ−i)
dµ−i
= k2µ−if0∆i(kµ−i) > (<)0
Finally let us prove the uniqueness part. When µ−i > 0 and µi ≥ 0
dU(µi)
dµi
= k2(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))− kµif0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))
−
∫ k(µi+µ−i)
0
f0∆i(δi)dδi
< k2(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))− kµif0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))
− k(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))
< 0
(87)
When µi ≤ −µ−i
dU(µi)
dµi
= k2(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))− kµif0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))
−
∫ k(µi+µ−i)
0
f0∆i(δi)dδi
≥ k2(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))− kµif0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))
− k(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))
> k2(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))− k(µi + µ−i)f0∆i(k(µi + µ−i))
≥ 0
(88)
This complete all the proof.
